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ABSTRACT
A FORMAL OBJECT MODEL FOR LAYERED NETWORKS TO
SUPPORT VERIFICATION AND SIMULATION
Rasha M. B. E. Morsi
Old Dominion University, 2002
Director Dr. James F. Leathrum, Jr.

This work presents an abstract formal model of the interconnection structure of
the Open Systems Interconnection Reference Model (OSI-RM) developed using ObjectOriented modeling principles permitting it to serve as a re-usable platform in supporting
the development of simulations and formal methods applied to layered network protocols.
A simulation of the object model using MODSIM III was developed and Prototype
Verification System (PVS) was used to show the applicability of the object model to
formal methods by formally specifying and verifying a Global Systems for Mobile
communications (GSM) protocol. This application has proved to be successful in two
aspects. The first was showing the existence of discrepancies between informal standard
protocol specifications, and the second was that communication over the layered GSM
network was verified. Although formal methods is somewhat difficult and time
consuming, this research shows the need for the formal specification of all
communication protocols to support a clear understanding of these protocols and to
provide consistency in their implementations.
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A domain for the application of this model is mobile cellular telecommunications
systems. Mobile Communications is one of the most rapidly expanding sectors of
telecommunications. Expectations of what a mobile cellular phone can do have vastly
increased the complexity of cellular communication networks, which makes it imperative
that protocol specifications be verified before implementation.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Mobile Communications

is one

of the

most

rapidly

expanding sectors of

telecommunications. Expectations of what a mobile cellular phone can do have vastly
increased the complexity of cellular communication networks.

In the near future, a

mobile phone is expected to offer us a lot more than just a phone call. In the new
information age, the mobile phone will become a multi-media communications device,
capable of sending and receiving graphic images and video. This will allow capabilities
such as surfing the Internet, on-line shopping and videoconferencing, which introduce a
high level of complexity into a system that also requires great scalability to meet
demands.

The complexity of the requirements placed on cellular communication systems make it
imperative that protocol specifications be verified before implementation.

The

development of network protocols and working network systems (software and hardware)
is difficult due to the available testing platforms.

Use of a real network for testing

purposes is difficult, expensive, and intrusive on existing operations. In the past, use of
simulation [36-40] and formal methods [2, 3, 4, 17, 24-29, 41] have assisted in this
process, but as separate efforts. This usually resulted in a duplication of efforts. The
development of simulation and formal verification from a common model facilitates the
rapid development of both, allowing them to complement each other rather than replicate
each other.
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The primary contribution o f this work is the development of a common object model
defining the interface and communication between layers in a layered network as defined
by the Open Systems Interconnection Reference Model (OSI-RM) [1]. This abstraction
allows a developer to focus on the development of protocols by fitting them into the
layered structure and studying the interaction between layers without rebuilding the
complete structure. This directly supports the development of simulations and formal
models to support the verification of the protocols. In particular, the structure allows
observance o f the interaction between layers, permitting verification of the complete
communication hierarchy without having to verify all layers in the verification of a single
layer. This is a major step beyond previous work that verified a protocol on a single
layer, ignoring the actual communication required to exchange information between like
layers on different network stations.

In addition, the common object model was implemented in both a simulation language
and a formal specification language to demonstrate the concept and facilitate future work
using the model. In this work, the re-usable model is shown to support simulation by
developing a simulation model that successfully simulates the communication within an
implementation independent layered network. The applicability of the object model to the
specification and verification of protocols is also shown using a Global Systems for
Mobile Communication (GSM) [8,9] protocol. It is demonstrated that with proper
application of abstraction techniques on the protocol, the model’s object oriented design
simplifies the formal verification process by providing a reusable framework where basic
concepts have already been developed and verified.
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3
1.1. FORMAL METHODS AND SIMULATION
Formal methods are a means of developing system descriptions in a higher order logic to
which automated reasoning is applied [2]. The term is usually used to refer to a variety
of mathematical modeling techniques that are applicable to computer system (software
and hardware) design. Formal methods can be applied to selected components of a
system and, at their most rigorous, formal methods involve computer-assisted proofs of
key properties regarding the behavior o f the system. Used early in the development life
cycle, such an approach will play an important role in improving and debugging the
system's requirements specification phase.

Computer simulation is the discipline o f designing a model of an actual or theoretical
physical system, simulating the model on a digital computer, and analyzing the execution
output. Simulation embodies the principle of “learning by doing” — to learn about the
system we must first build a model of some sort and then operate the model. To
understand reality and all of its complexity, we must build artificial objects and
dynamically act out roles with them [36].

It is proposed in this work that it is advantageous to apply both formal methods and
simulation techniques in the design process of communication protocols. Simulation is
capable of testing certain scenarios defined by the designer, but simulation alone is
incapable of testing the complete test space unless a simulation is performed for every
possible scenario which is very time consuming and tedious. Formal methods would
complement simulation in this aspect since a formal specification can benefit system
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design in two different ways: concepts and notations from mathematics can provide
methodological assistance by helping us think and communicate our ideas, and
mathematical modeling can allow us to calculate some properties of our designs.

A drawback of formal methods is that they have weak support for real time systems.
Since time ranges over an infinite domain, all tools that have been developed for finite
state verification cannot be naively applied to real time systems. On the other hand,
simulations are well suited to deal with stochastic models and are more frequently used
for the performance analysis of systems. Therefore, it is proposed that formal methods be
applied to behavioral verification and simulation to performance analysis.

The process of formalizing a specification provides a simple validation check, since it
forces a level of explicitness not available in informal representations. Once a formal
specification is developed, it can be formally challenged by defining properties that
should hold and proving that they do indeed hold. This increases the test space coverage
mentioned earlier, since properties about the system are tested, not specific scenarios. It
needs to be mentioned that the efficiency of the formal proofs will depend on the
designer proving all necessary properties of a design.

A further consideration is the mathematical domain of discourse. Applications that are
heavily based on numerical processing, especially those using floating point arithmetic,
pose some difficulties for formal methods, as well as highly procedural or numerical
applications, or applications that have few unifying features (e.g., stochastic processes).
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Historically, working with axiomatic representations of real numbers to reason with rigor
about traditional engineering mathematics has been found to be an awkward and daunting
task [2]. On the other hand, applications that can be modeled using the domains of logic
and discrete mathematics benefit from easier formalization, more tractable reasoning, and
better formal methods tool support

Formal methods have been used in the past in the verification of communication
protocols but its success has been hindered by the lack of reusable models. Usually,
system proofs are performed, but frameworks to prove classes of systems are lacking
[44]. It now becomes apparent that both simulation and formal methods have limitations
and by creating a common model, the model development necessary to support both
activities can be reduced.

1.2. COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL DEVELOPMENT
Protocol design is usually carried out in two phases. The first phase involves the
definition of the functions of the protocol as far as possible in an implementationindependent way, but in such a way that proper interworking of peer protocol entities is
guaranteed [17]. The resulting design supports the definition of open systems and is
usually produced by a standardization body, and published as an international standard or
recommendation. It is then known as a protocol. The second phase is producing the
implementation-dependent design.
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A large number of practical protocols have only informal English specifications. In the
past, neither simulation nor formal methods have been heavily used in the
communication protocol design process. A formal specification helps in achieving a
consistent interpretation and thus decreases ambiguities and increases the likelihood of
interoperability of implementations with multiple, independent developers.

Formal

methods and simulation provide an increased confidence level in the protocol design.

.

13 OBJECT-ORIENTED MODEL FOR LAYERED NETWORKS
In this work, an abstract formal model of the interconnection structure of the OSI-RM
was developed using Object-Oriented (0 0 ) modeling principles permitting it to serve as
a re-usable platform. Once this framework is in place, it will help protocol designers to
develop simulations and formal verifications focusing more on the protocol o f interest
rather than the layered structure of the network in which it resides. It also provides a
mechanism to study the interaction between protocols at different layers rather than just
the functionality of a single protocol. This will obviously reduce time necessary for users
to develop new protocols or refine existing ones with a higher confidence.

The present work is focused on the modeling of the OSI-RM, but this method is
applicable to other layered communication standards in both networking and
telecommunications such as the Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA)
[42], the Runtime Infrastructure (RTI) in the High Level Architecture (HLA) [43], and
Global Systems for Mobile Communications (GSM) [8,9], among others. The abstract
formal model of the OSI Reference Model was simulated using MODSIM III.
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7
example of a GSM protocol was used as an application of this model. The Prototype
Verification System (PVS) [11] was used to verify the Mobile Originated (MO) Call
setup procedure (part o f the Radio Interface Layer 3 -RIL3) [33].

1.4. OVERVIEW
Chapter 2 is a background chapter introducing the OSI-RM along with a detailed
description of the layered structure, cellular communications, GSM and formal methods.
In Chapter 3, current work in protocol verification and object oriented design modeling is
presented. Chapter 4 discusses the GSM Public Land Mobile Network and its architecture
while Chapter 5 includes a description o f the OSI-RM formal object model along with the
MODSIM simulation developed. A generalized, re-usable PVS specification structure is
presented for the OSI-RM discussing horizontal vs. vertical validation of communication.
Chapter 6 introduces the GSM Radio Interface Layer 3 protocol, which includes a brief
description of the RIL3 sub-layer communication structure and the formal verification of
one of its protocols as an example for the application of our re-usable OSI-RM formal
communication model.
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2. BACKGROUND

In this chapter, the OSI-RM is introduced in Section 2.1, along with a detailed description
of it’s layered structure. A short history of cellular communications and Global Systems
for Mobile Communications (GSM), including an explanation of GSM’s architectural
components, is presented in Section 2.2. Finally, Section 2.3 discusses formal methods,
its advantages, modeling using formal methods and formal specification and verification
languages.

2.1. OSI-RM
The Open Systems Interconnection Reference Model (OSI-RM) is a standardized, empty
framework, the aim of which is to provide a common framework that allows existing and
evolving applications (e.g. FTP, telnet, etc..) to cooperate irrespective of the type of
computer on which they are running. It provides a common basis for the coordination of
standards development for systems interconnection, while allowing existing standards to
be placed into perspective within the overall model [1]. The OSI-RM does not serve as an
implementation specification; it provides a conceptual and functional framework that
allows professionals worldwide to work productively and independently on the
development of standards for each layer in the model. The OSI is concerned with the
exchange of information between open systems and not the internal functioning of each
individual real open system.
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2.1.1. The layer concept
The OSI-RM consists o f seven layers; each layer performs a well defined function and
provides a set of functions to the layer above, and relies on the functions of the layer
below (Figure 1). Each entity communicates with the entities above or below it across an
interface while the communication between peer entities appears to be horizontal
between nodes.

(N+l)-entity

(N+l)-layer

(N)-entity

(N)-Iayer

(N-l)-entity

(N-l)-layer

Figure 1. The layer concept

The principles used to determine the seven layers in the Reference Model are [1]:
•

Create enough layers so that the system-engineering task of describing and
integrating them is not too complicated.

•

Create a boundary at a point where the description of services can be small and the
number of interactions across the boundary is minimal.
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• Collect similar functions in the same layer and separate layers to handle functions that
are different in the process performed or the technology involved.
• Each layer is supposed to be independent of the other layers so that a layer can be
totally redesigned without changing the services expected from or provided to the
adjacent layers (Object Oriented approach).

2.1.2. The seven layers of the OSI-RM

Application
Presentation
Session
Transport
Network
Data-link
Physical
Figure 2. The seven layers of the OSI-RM

In Figure 2, the application layer provides network services. It includes functions
performed by programs as well as functions performed by human beings. The
Presentation layer converts data to the representation used by the local computer while
the Session layer provides the ability for cooperating presentation entities to organize and
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synchronize their dialogue and manage their data exchange (i.e., establishes sessions
between presentation entities). The Transport layer multiplexes data streams from
different applications and provides transparent transfer of data between session-entities.
The route taken by the packets through the network is provided by the Network layer. It
directs packets to the correct destination computer. The Data Link layer detects and
corrects any errors on the link. It also provides flow control from one node to the next,
and finally, the Physical layer defines the characteristics of the physical connections, e.g.,
type of wire, etc.. This is the only layer that actually sends bits to another computer.

2.1.3. The Reference Model
Figure 3 shows an abstract view of two adjacent layers in the OSI-RM derived from the
OSI Reference Recommendation.

N+l - Layer

N+l Entity

N+I Entity

/ S hN
l functions/

. functions/

N+l - sub
system
N-SAP

N-connectionendpoint- —
identifier
N - Layer
N Entity

function:

N Entity

N-Protocol

function:

N -s u b 
system

Figure 3. An abstract view of two adjacent layers ia the OSI-RM (35|
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A layer may contain only one subsystem which is an element in the hierarchical division
of an open system. The sub-system can interact directly with elements in the next higher
or the next lower division of that open system. Within the sub-system, one or more
entities may be present An N-entity is an active element within an N-subsystem
embodying a set of capabilities defined for that N-layer and the N-protocol is a set of
rules and formats which determine the communication behavior of the N-entities in the
performance of the N-functions [1].

Communication between the layers is achieved through the Service Access Points (SAP).
These are points that are used by entities in adjacent layers to provide services.
Communication between peer N+l-entities is possible. The association is established
using the N-protocol as shown in Figure 4.

Communication
N+lentity

N +lentity

N-sub-system

N+l-layer

N-SAP

N-entity

N-entity
Nprotocol

N-layer

N-sub-system

Flgare 4. Commiiaicatioi betweea peer-eatities in u opea system
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The communication in Figure 4 is very similar to communication between open systems
shown in Figure 5.

End-to-end communication service

►

Application
"
+
Presentation
~~ +
Session

zz:

Application
Presentation
Session

PSN1

PSN2
Transport

Transport

J I —
Network
♦
Data Link

Network
Data Link

Network
**
Data Link

Network
_ 4 _
Data Link

~^T ~

Z
Physical Layer

Figure 5. Example of data flow via intermediate open systems

2.2. CELLULAR COMMUNICATIONS
Cellular mobile radio, the technology that enables everyone to communicate with
anybody anywhere, has created an entire industry in mobile communication. This
industry is rapidly growing and has become the backbone for business success and a part
of modem lifestyles all over the world. In this section, an overview of a basic cellular
system will be discussed.
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2.2.1. A basic cellular system
Several attributes are needed for the realization of a cellular radio service:
1. A contiguous arrangement of radio cells so that the mobile units can always
operate at acceptable radio signal levels
2. A roaming feature by which mobile units can have continuous service as they
roam the geographical area of the service
3. Frequency agility in the radio telephone
4. A fully integrated transparent fixed network managing these operations
Figure 6 [6] shows the main components o f a basic cellular system.

LandT elqjhone Network

Voice Circuits

Mobile Telephone
Switching Center
Deditaed Voice Ckade Circuits

Ceil sies
( Radio base
a a k n sies)

Figure 6. Cellular system

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

15
A basic cellular system consists of three parts: a mobile unit, a cell site, and a Mobile
Telephone Switching Office (MTSO).
•

Mobile Units contain a control unit, a transceiver, and an antenna.

•

A Cell Site provides interface between the MTSO and the mobile units. It has a
control unit, radio cabinets, antennas, a power plant (just in case the power is cut off),
and data terminals.

•

The

MTSO

is

the

central

coordinating

element

for

all

cell

sites.

It

contains the cellular processor and cellular switch. It interfaces with the telephone
company zone offices, controls call processing, and handles billing activities.

2.2.2. Global Systems for Mobile Communications (GSM)
By the end of the 1980s, it became clear that analog cellular systems would not be able to
meet continuing demand unless something was done about the inherent limitations of
these systems, namely:
• severely confined spectrum allocations,
• a perception that the systems were limited in usefulness because of interference
occurring while the mobiles moved about in a multi-path fading environment
• inability to substantially reduce the cost of mobile terminals and infrastructure
• incompatibility among various analog systems, which prevents the subscriber from
using the phone abroad.
The solution was to use digital techniques. In 1982, the Conference of European Posts
and Telegraphs (CEPT) formed a study group called GSM (Groupe Special Mobile) to
develop a set of common standards for a future pan-European cellular mobile
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network, which was to be the solution they were looking for. In 1989, GSM
responsibility was transferred to the European Telecommunications Standards Institute
(ETSI), and in 1992, the commercial launch of GSM service in Europe took place. GSM
now stands for Global Systems for Mobile Communications, and its popularity is rapidly
growing. In 199S, GSM had more than 5 million subscribers, not only in Europe, but all
over the world.

GSM is considered to be an evolving standard, where the specifications and networks are
produced using a phased approach. Phases 1 and 2 are now in service. Phase 2+
addendum is being updated on a regular basis according to market needs and availability
of specifications. Phase 3 (UMTS) is in the design process.

2.2.3. GSM Architecture
The GSM system is a combination o f three major sub-systems: the network subsystem,
the radio subsystem, and the operation support subsystem. The network subsystem
includes equipment and functions related to end-to-end calls, management of subscribers,
mobility, and interface with the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN). The radio
subsystem includes equipment and functions related to the management of the
connections on the radio path, including handovers (the process of changing the
frequency channel while going from one cell to the next). This equipment includes:
•

the Mobile Station (MS),

•

the Subscriber Identification Module (SIM) which is a smart card with a
microprocessor, a RAM, and a ROM that contains subscriber ID information,
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•

the Base Transceiver Station (BTS), a network component present in each
cell that contains several transceivers, and

•

the Base Station Controller (BSC) which is a network component with
functions to control one or more BTSs.

Finally, the operation support subsystem contains the Operational and Management
Center (OMC) which includes operation and management of GSM equipment and
supports the operator network interface. The OMC also maintains a country’s Home
Location Register (HLR) and performs administrative functions within a country, e.g.,
billing. Figure 7 [8] shows a typical architecture for GSM; following that is a brief
explanation of some of its components.

Networic
M anagem ent canter

OMC

AUC
ISDN
Equipment ID
BSS (BSC + BTS )

IWF

MS

SS7
BTS

MS

XC

EC

BTS

MS

VLR

Ftgare 7. Typical GSM architecture
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MSC : Mobile-services Switching Center. It performs functions of switching, routing and
control of the call and charging and accounting. Also controls the internetworking
with fixed networks.
BSS : BTS + BSC, viewed by the MSC through a single interface as being the entity
responsible for communication with the MSs in a certain area.
HLR: Home Location Register, current location and all subscriber parameters of a
mobile station are permanently stored.
VLR: Visitor Location Register, the location register where all relevant parameters
concerning a mobile station are stored as long as the MS is in a location area
controlled by this register.
A U C : Authentication center, contains subscriber authentication keys and generates
security related parameters depending on implementation.
EIR : Equipment Identity Register, International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI)
numbers are stored.
EC : Echo canceller, reduces the annoying effect caused by mobile network when
connected to a PSTN circuit.
IW F : Internetworking Function, interface between MSC and other networks such as
PSTN and ISDN.

It can be seen in Figure 7 that GSM decided to specify not only the air interface, but also
the main interfaces that identify different parts of the architecture. The three dominant
parts are: an interface between the MSC and the BSC, an A-interface between the BSC
and the BTS, and the radio interface between the BTS and the MS.
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2.2.4. Functional Layers of GSM
The GSM system can be described by considering several functional layers arranged in
hierarchical foim. These layers are the physical layer, the data link layer and Layer 3. The
physical layer is the lowest layer o f radio interface and it provides functions to transfer
bit streams over the physical radio links. The data link layer provides a reliable dedicated
signaling link between the Mobile Station (MS) and Base Transceiver Station (BTS),
details of which will be explained in the next section. Layer 3, which is of particular
interest here, is considered as the application layer. It consists of three sub-layers : Radio
Resource Management (RR), Mobility Management (MM), and the Call Control
Management (CC or CM) sub-layer. The overall objectives of these three sub-layers are:
•

RR performs the establishment, operation, and release of a dedicated radio channel
connection,

•

MM defines the dialog between the MS and the network, provides connection
management services to the Call Control Layer, location update, authentication, and
Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI) reallocation,

•

CC performs the establishment, maintenance, and termination of circuit-switched
calls, and includes independent entities for Short Message Services (SMS) and
Supplementary Services (SS).

2.2.5. GSM Protocol Model
Figure 8 [8] shows the signaling protocols in the GSM system and how they relate to the
seven layers of the OSI model.
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The RR protocols provide control functions for the operation of common and dedicated
channels. This sub-layer contains many protocols, namely:
•

RIL3 RR : Radio Interface Layer 3; a protocol which establishes and releases radio
connections between MS and various BSCs for die duration of the call, provides
system information broadcasting, and inter- and intracell change of channels. The
MM and CC versions deal with the mobility and call processing issues.

•

RSM: Radio Subsystem Management protocol provides functions between the BTS
and the BSC.

•

DTAP: Direct Transfer Application Part protocol provides RR messages between the
MS and the MSC.

•

BSSMAP: Base Station Subsystem Management Application Part protocol provides
RR messages between the BSC and the MSC

•

“Distribution” protocol: makes the distinction between DTAP and BSSMAP.

•

TCAP: Transaction Capabilities Application Part, supports transactions between 2
nodes of the network and manages transaction on an end-to-end basis

•

MAP: Mobile Application Part Protocol, functions between the MSC, VLR, HLR,
and AUC in the form o f query and response messages. These protocols are designated
as MAP/B through MAP/H.

2J. FORMAL METHODS
Formal methods are an efficient way to satisfy the growing demand for accurate and
reliable mobile computing services. It is a means of developing systems in a higher order
logic to which automated or semi-automated reasoning may be applied. Formal Methods
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refer to the use of techniques from logic to discrete mathematics in the specification,
design, and construction of computer systems and software. It can be used to specify and
model the behavior o f a system and to mathematically verify that the system design and
implementation satisfy the system functional and safety properties.

There are a variety o f techniques that vary in their form and rigor (Figure 9). There is the
occasional mathematical notation embedded in the English text, which is the least
rigorous form of formal methods. The most rigorous form and most expensive is the use
of a fully formal specification language for the specification of a system. What makes a
technique a “Formal Method” is the logic based programming language concepts (e.g.,
data types, module structure, generics), which are able to express what is done without
saying how it is done.

least rigorous

Occasional mathematical
notation embedded in
English specifications

spectrum of rigor

•

•

•

most rigorous

Fully formal specification
languages with precise
semantics

Figure 9. Formal Methods' spectrum of rigor

There are many advantages to Formal Methods. They can discover defects in the design
and specification phases of a system’s life cycle thus reducing the probability of them
occurring in the implementation phase. Also defining specifications formally makes the
system more consistent since requirements can be checked in a repeatable manner.
Formal methods can be applied to selected components of a system, and can be used just
to check selected properties of that system. Used early in the development life cycle, such
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an approach will play an important role in improving and debugging the system's
requirements specification phase (Figure 10). The process of formalizing a specification
provides a simple validation check, since it forces a level of explicitness not available in
informal representations. Once a formal specification is developed, it can be formally
challenged by defining properties that should hold, and proving that they do indeed hold.
Creating a validation model is one way of validating these formal challenges.

Real World
Validation
of
model

Preliminary
Requirements Analysis

User
Formalization
Requirements
Specification

Verification
of
design

Evolutions

Transformation

Design Specification

Evolutions

Design Implementation

Figure 10. Development stages of a formal system

A validation model is a formal model that defines the interactions of processes in a
system. It does not resolve implementation details nor does it say how a message is to be
transmitted, encoded, or sorted. By simplifying the problem in this way, we eliminate
disturbing detail, avoid premature commitment to implementation, and focus on the
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essence of the problem at hand [1]. Some phrases that are often used in Formal Methods
are in need of some explanation. These are described here.

A Formal Specification is a translation of a non-mathematical description (diagrams,
tables, English text) into a formal specification language with a concise description of
high-level behavior and properties of a system. The well-defined formal language
semantics used support formal deduction about the specification.

Formal proofs are a complete and convincing argument for validity of some property of
the system description. They are constructed as a series o f steps which draw conclusions
from a set of assumptions.

This eliminates ambiguity and subjectivity inherent when

drawing informal conclusions. Formal proofs may be manual but are usually constructed
with automated assistance.

Abstraction is the process o f paying strict attention to the aspects of a phenomenon that
are important and paying less attention to those that are not. It is important for
specification readability, implementation independence and modeling convenience. A
protocol specification should give the designer access to a range of abstraction levels.
With a very complex protocol, a designer needs to work at a very high level of
abstraction to gain an overall understanding of the protocol behavior. Abstraction helps
avoid premature commitment to design and implementation choices
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2J.1. Modeling using Formal Methods
For a chosen application, the process of applying Formal Methods involves going
through some phases of development, such as: characterizing the application, modeling,
specification, analysis, and documentation.

•

The Characterization Phase involves total understanding of an application in order to
be able to justifiably choose an appropriate model and the most appropriate
specification and validation techniques.

•

The Modeling Phase is where a suitable mathematical representation is chosen to
formalize the application. Calculus o f Communicating Systems (CCS), which is a
process algebra developed for modeling concurrent communicating systems, is an
example.

•

The Specification Phase involves formalizing the application by composing a
specification using the chosen model and analyzing the syntactic and semantic
correctness of the specification.

•

The Analysis Phase is the validation phase. It involves interpreting the specification
and proving key properties.

•

The Documentation Phase includes recording any assumptions made in the proof and
all necessary aspects of documentation needed to provide a clear and unambiguous
portrayal of specification requirements.

In the context of formal methods, the most useful models tend to be abstract
representations that focus on essential characteristics expressed in reasonably general
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terms and formalized in judiciously chosen mathematics, that is, in mathematical
representations that are suitably expressive and provide sufficient analytic power [2].

The advantages of using mathematical models are:
• They are more precise than informal descriptions written in the plain English since
thorough examination and explicit assumptions need to be made.
•

They can be used to predict the behavior of the system being modeled, and

•

They can be analyzed using existing methods of mathematical reasoning.

Figure 11 shows a general view of Formal Methods tools.
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Figure 11. General formal method tools

2.4. FORMAL SPECIFICATION AND VERIFICATION LANGUAGES
Formal methods are supported in the specification and analysis phases with mechanized
tools that perform syntactic, semantic, and proof checking. One such tool is the Prototype

Verification System (PVS) [11]. PVS was primarily written by Sam Owre and N. Shanker
of SRI International Computer Science Laboratory and builds on nearly 20 years of
experience at SRI in building and using tools to support formal methods. It is a general-
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purpose verification system which provides mechanized support for formal specification
and verification. The distinguishing feature of PVS is its synergistic integration o f an
expressive specification language and powerful theorem-proving capabilities.

PVS consists of a specification language, a number of predefined theories, a theorem
prover, and various utilities and documentation. Some elements of the specification
language are made possible because the typechecker can use theorem proving which
allows efficient treatment of many examples that are considered difficult for other
verification systems. The specification language is based on classical, typed higher-oider
logic intended mainly for the formalization of requirements and design-level
specifications analysis o f intricate and difficult problems. Some applications of PVS are
algorithms and architectures for fault-tolerant flight control systems and problems in
hardware and real time system design

Recently, PVS has been used for the formal specification of Communication protocols
[26,27,28] and is used in this work for the development of a structure for specifying
layered protocols and then the specification of part of the RIL3 protocol for GSM as an
example.

There are other languages being used, some of which are as follows:
•

Language o f Temporal Ordering Specifications (LOTOS) is an international formal
specification technique for specifying concurrent and distributed systems. It consists
of a language for specifying processes (similar to CCS - mentioned later) and an
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algebraic specification language called ACT ONE. LOTOS has been applied
extensively, in both universities and industry, to the specification o f OSI protocols.
•

Calculus o f Communicating Systems (CCS) [19] which is a process algebra developed
for modeling concurrent communicating systems. CCS has very sparse yet rich
semantics, and a rich set o f laws, used to specify the algorithmic structure of
concurrent processes. The Edinburgh Concurrency Workbench (CWB) is used to
model check the CCS specifications.

•

The Higher Order Logic (HOL) system is a theorem prover that uses higher-order
logic to prove theorems about specifications using the meta Language ML.

•

Symbolic Model Verifier (SMV) is used to check finite state systems against their
specifications. It uses its own state-machine language to model the system, and uses
CTL (an extension of Boolean Logic) to define the set of properties. CTL has four
formulas: atomic formulas, propositional formulas, next-state logic, and 'until' logic.
One can readily specify a system as a synchronous Mealy machine, or as an
asynchronous network of abstract, nondeterministic processes. The language provides
for modeler hierarchical

descriptions,

and

for the definition

of reusable

components[31]. SMV is freeware limited to research institutions. It was developed at
Carnegie Mellon University.
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3. CURRENT WORK IN PROTOCOL VERIFICATION AND
OBJECT ORIENTED MODELING

3.1. FORMAL

METHODS

AND

THEIR

USE

IN

COMMUNICATION

PROTOCOL VERIFICATION
An engineer in telecommunications needs a method for describing feature behavior in a
telephone system (like call forwarding) in a way that is complete, consistent and
unambiguous. The application of Formal Methods is a solution that provides reliability
and a notation for the formal specification of a system whereby the desired properties are
described and can be reasoned about

Formal Methods are in fact increasingly being used in the telecommunications industry.
It’s use is becoming quite popular in the formal verification of communication protocols.
Work has been done in the formal verification of different aspects of the protocols
available in the OSI Session Layer. Work is being done on the ATM ABR scheme [25],
Kermit FTP [21], IP Protocols [26]. This work is discussed in this chapter, emphasizing
how Formal Methods are being used in the verification/validation process.

3.2. CURRENT WORK IN PROTOCOL VERIFICATION
Formal Description Techniques (FDTs) are becoming of particular interest in the area of
design, validation, and verification of protocols. This interest arises because of the need
for reliable and well defined protocols in the ever-growing industry of communicating
systems. A protocol is essentially a system o f concurrent, independent, entities that
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interact via a possibly unreliable exchange of messages [4]. It, by definition, must state
precisely what sequence of events are allowed, and present all the details in an
unambiguous manner to a large audience of implemented to insure that independently
developed systems work together seamlessly.

The advance in protocol specification using FDTs in recent years has opened up a new
horizon for protocol development [16]. Protocol design is usually carried out in two
phases. The first phase involves the definition of the functions of the protocol as far as
possible in an implementation-independent manner, but in such a way that proper
interworking of peer protocol entities is guaranteed [17]. The resulting design supports
the definition of open systems and is usually produced by a standardization body, and
published as an international standard or recommendation. It is then known as a protocol.
The second phase is producing the implementation-dependant design.

A large number of practical protocols have only informal English specifications. A
formal specification helps in achieving a consistent interpretation and thus decreases
ambiguities and increases the likelihood o f interoperability of implementations. Figure
12 shows the stages of verification and validation that are used in protocol design and
development. The main feature of formal development is stepwise refinement. The
specification becomes clear from a process of transformations going from the highest
abstraction level to the lowest one where each step is validated and verified.
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A main concern of protocol designers is testing the consequences of a specification, and
gaining confidence in its validity. Another main concern is verifying that the
implementation satisfies the specification. It is obvious that verification is one of the
essential reasons for the interest in the use of formal methods in protocol design. This is
so because of the necessity that different implementations have to conform to the
specification in order to be mutually compatible. Several efforts in the use of formal
methods applied to communication are presented here.
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3.2.1. OSI-RM Session Layer specification and verification
Work has been done in the application of existing mathematical methods and automated
tools to specify and test existing protocols [5]. The chosen formal method in this case was
Milner’s process algebra called the Calculus of Communicating Systems (CCS). CCS
was applied to the specification and verification of the Open Systems Interconnection
(OSI) Session Layer (SL). The Session Layer service and Session Layer protocol were
modeled on CCS, and verified using CCS’s automated model checker, and Edinburgh
Concurrency Workbench (CWB). The Edinburgh Concurrency Workbench (CWB) was
used to model check the CCS specifications. In order to formally verify a protocol, CCS
needed to be embedded into a formal verification system. The Larch Shared Language,
which is supported by an automated theorem prover called Penelope, was chosen.

As a result of this work, CCS was shown to be a suitable formal method used to specify,
validate and verify protocols. Stepwise refinement was used to obtain a protocol
specification from a general service specification. It was also verified that the protocol
specification behaves in the same way as the session service specification.

Application of CCS to the specification and verification of the Session Layer provided
the conclusion that the use of Formal methods aids in the understanding of the problem
and leads to unambiguous and correct specifications. Formal specification and
verification exposes many design errors that would be very difficult to discover through
manual verification. For example, some typing errors and inconsistencies were
discovered in the ISO standard.
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The use of formal theorem provers exposed all assumptions that must be used in order to
completely specify and verify the protocol. They were also found to be suitable for
reusable parameterized specifications, such as the specification of a general buffer of size
n. It was concluded that it was easy to translate ISO standards into concise and
understandable CCS specifications.

3.2.2. Standardization of RLP1 protocol
The formal language SDL was used to standardize and validate the RLP1 protocol [20]
and see the effect of the validation on its standardization before publication. SDL was
used since it is a well recognized formal language and it is also used by the international
telecommunication community. The biggest disadvantage of using SDL, discovered
through this work, is the lack o f suitable tools. Formal SDL was seen to be very tedious
and as a result the committee used informal SDL text extensively. Most verification was
done using visual inspection and manual walk-throughs. In this respect, SDL was found
to be very difficult to use in the specification of complex algorithms. The SDL code was
translated into Promela and SPIN was used for the validation process.

It was concluded through this work that no single formal notation is going to be adequate
or appropriate for a complete standard or system. A suite of accepted formalisms for
various parts of a standard is required. It was also noted that even without validation
tools, a formal notation is useful during standardization since it allows informal
validation via code walk-throughs.
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.

3.23 Specification and Verification of Kermit FTP
The specification and verification of the popular Kermit File Transfer Protocol (FTP) is
another example of the use of formal methods in the specification and verification of
communication protocols [22]. The goal o f this work was to obtain a faithful, readable
specification which allows one to formalize the intuitive verification proof without much
overhead [22]. The evolving algebra approach was used in the specification and
verification of two more abstract communication protocols used by various versions of
Kermit: the alternating bit protocol and the sliding window protocol. These two protocols
have also been specified and verified by many authors [22, 23, 24]. Kermit was
considered at three different layers of abstraction: the session, transport, and data-link
layers. Safety and liveness properties were proven

3.2.4. Specification of ATM’s ABR protocols
Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) is a network protocol that provides a common
format for transmitting voice, data, and video over B-ISDN systems. ATM's available bit
rate (ABR) service was used as a case study for the application of formal specification
and verification of communication protocols [25]. In this work, the ABR protocols were
modeled by parameterized communicating extended finite state machines (FSM) with
timers. The protocol was formally specified by the specification of the transitions of the
system.
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3.25. Summary
It is clear that most of the work being done on the validation and verification of
communication systems is confined to the V&V of communication protocols. There has
not yet been published any work done on a more abstract level to formally specify and
verify a reusable structure in the telecommunication industry.

The usefulness of formal methods in communication system design is obvious. It aids in
the understanding of the problem and leads to unambiguous and correct specifications. It
also exposes many design errors and inconsistencies that would otherwise be discovered
during the implementation stage. The drawbacks are the complexity of the effort and the
lack of reusable effort.

.

33 FORMAL METHODS AND OBJECT ORIENTED MODELING
The goal of a design methodology is to provide a simple and efficient means for
structuring the process leading from an informal application description to a precise
design specification [14]. Using an object-oriented approach, principles of aggregating
data items together with operations performed on them, is applied, calling the whole an
object. An application may be a composition of such objects. There are a few advantages
of this approach:
1) Information hiding principle is naturally supported
2) At the informal level of description, the concept of an object is very common and
hence a design description and implementation framework supporting this concept
would lead to more readable specifications.
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3) Properties, which are defined for general types of objects, can be inherited by objects
in a sub-class.

Formal methods adds mathematical rigor to the development, analysis and operation of
computer-based systems. Although Formal Methods are often presented by devotees as
‘the’ solution to the increasing complexity of information systems, its use in industry is
minimal, primarily due to the added complexity. Both Object Orientation and Formal
Methods have evolved separately even though many aspects of the object oriented
paradigm are similar to those found in formal methods. These include the description of
class behavior in an implementation independent manner, the use of inheritance to
indicate subtype relations, and the reliance on well understood mathematical concepts
and abstractions such as sets, sequences and functions.

It seems obvious that a combination of formal methods and object oriented design
concepts would be very beneficial. In recent years, researchers have started to investigate
the benefits of this integration.

One of the recognized strengths of the object-oriented paradigm is that a common core of
basic ideas can support modeling at all levels of abstraction [13]. Object oriented design
methods usually comprise a number of design steps.

A preliminary informal step consists of the identification of the general problem and any
specifics related to the intended model. The first step is the identification of the main
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components o f the model. This involves the description of the functionalities to be
provided by the set of entities in the model. It also provides the relationship among these
entities. The second step is the allocation of the functions as operations offered by objects
identified in step one. Some new objects may be uncovered by some of these functions
which would then be integrated in the model. The last step involves the definition of the
behavior of the objects. This behavior would consider possible sequences of operation
calls and the processing that would be needed for them.

33.1. Formal Methods and Object Orientation: The gains
Object Oriented designers need formal techniques in order to support their methodologies
with a sound formal basis and formal methods people use object-oriented engineering
concepts to make their mathematical models easier to handle [13]. Figure 13 shows how
object-oriented features are incorporated into a formal method. From an object-oriented
perspective, there are a number of benefits to be gained by the use of formal description
techniques in the design process. Formal description techniques enhance the
understanding o f the object-oriented models. This is due to the un-ambiguity of the
formal specification process, which also promotes the concept of re-use o f model
components.
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Figure 13. Incorporation of object-oriented features into formal methods |13)

The perception is different for the formal methods community. The idea is to make their
languages more user-friendly by applying concepts o f object orientation. Many formal
specification languages have been either extended or re-interpreted within an objectoriented framework. LOTOS [10] and Z [46] are examples of such languages. The model
used to allow for this re-interpretation was developed by a group at BT Labs in the UK.
They developed a set theoretic model that incorporated the basic structural ideas of the
object-oriented paradigm (OOP). The group claims that by identifying a formal language
with four basic concepts, it is possible to interpret it according to the paradigm. These
four concepts are:
•

partial specifications (class templates)

•

instantiation rales
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•

incremental modification of class templates

•

pre-order on the set o f class templates which maps into a set-theoretic inclusion
hierarchy of classes.

This work was later formalized in the ISO Reference Model for Open Distributed
Processing (ODP) [14].

The OOP used in a formal methods environment adds value to it. The following are
points to be noted on the gains of applying OOP concepts to formal methods:
•

A more concise specification is achieved by factoring out commonalties. OOP
concepts allow for this through the distinction between objects and classes advocated
by the paradigm.

•

Cleaner, easier to refine specifications are achieved by the use of the natural
separation of abstraction levels in the OOP, induced by the distinction between
internal behavior of an entity and external communication through well defined
interfaces.

•

The specification of concurrency is a main concern in formal methods and is very
difficult to handle. Objects in OOP are a natural unit for concurrency control due to
the fact that OOP perceives the world as a collection of loosely coupled agents
executing activities in parallel.

•

Re-use of specifications can be achieved through inheritance.

•

A basic class specification can be refined to suit the more detailed requirements
imposed upon it for use in different levels o f abstraction.
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•

Object orientation simplifies the writing o f the specification and helps in the formal
reasoning stages. This can be seen by thinking that what holds for a class, must hold
for every subclass. Re-use of proofs would be an enormous advantage here.

Looking at the previous points, it becomes obvious how useful object-orientation is in the
world of formal methods.

Object oriented design methods add a new dimension to the models used in formal
methods and brings them closer to the real world, but there is a tradeoff. Although the
adoption of object oriented paradigm brings powerful abstraction and structure
mechanisms to the design; classes, inheritance, and other constructs need to be formally
defined and integrated within the semantic model if they are to be used in a truly formal
methodology.

However, the usefulness o f object-oriented notions in making the

understanding of specifications easier is a great benefit. Unambiguity is a main concern
in formal definitions and the OOP enhances this quality.
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4. GSM PUBLIC LAND MOBILE NETWORK (PLMN)

4.1. PLMN, AN INTRODUCTION
The GSM Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) is a network whose general objectives
are to give users a wide range of services and facilities, both voice and non-voice, that are
compatible with those offered by fixed networks through standardized access to these
networks. It also gives services and facilities exclusive to mobile situations and
compatibility of access to the GSM network to any mobile subscriber in any country of
the CEPT who operates the GSM system. Some of these services include automatic
roaming, locating and updating mobile subscribers. A GSM PLMN aims to give
subscribers a service with a good quality level to a wide range o f mobile stations,
including vehicle-mounted stations, portable stations, and handheld stations. It also aims
to give high efficiency from the radio-electrical spectrum and allow an attractive
economic cost in terms of both infrastructure and mobile equipment.

4.2. PLMN NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
Figure 14 shows the basic configuration of a PLMN. An exchange of data occurs
between the entities in the PLMN. Some of these entities and functions are described as
follows:
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1 “© E T SI2000. further use, modification, redistribution is strictly prohibited. ETSI standards are available
from publication@etsi.fr, and http://www.etsi.org/eds/eds.htm
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The Home Location Register (HLR):
This database is responsible for the management of mobile subscribers. A PLMN may
contain one or more of these HLRs; the exact number would depend on the number of
subscribers, the capacity of the equipment and the organization of the network. It stores
all the subscription data, which includes the location of each MS for call routing
purposes. All management interventions occur on this database. The HLRs have no direct
control of the MSCs. Two important numbers are also stored in the HLRs, the IMSI and
the MDISDN. Other information included is the location information (VLR number),
basic telecommunication services subscription information, service restrictions (e.g.
roaming limitation) and supplementary services.

The Visitor Location Register (VLR):
A Mobile station roaming in an MSC is controlled by the VLR in charge of that area. As
soon as an MS appears in a location area it starts a location updating procedure. The
MSC in charge of that area notices the registration and transfers to the VLR responsible
for that area. A VLR may be responsible for one or more MSC. The VLR also contains
information needed to handle the calls set up or received by the MSs registered in its
database. In some cases, the VLR may have to obtain more information from the HLR of
an MS. Numbers stored in the VLR are the IMSI, the MSISDN, the TMSI (if applicable),
the location where the MS has been registered (used to call the station), and
supplementary service parameters.
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The Mobile Services Switching Center (MSC):
This is an exchange which performs all the switching functions for MSs located in a
geographical area designated as the MSC area. The difference between an MSC and a
fixed network exchange is that the MSC has to consider the impact o f the allocation of
radio resources and the mobile nature of the subscribers and has to perform, for example,
procedures required for the location registration and those required for hand-over.

The Base Station System (BSS):
The BSS is a sub-system of the Base Station equipment (transceivers, controllers, etc...),
which is viewed by the MSC through a single interface (A-interface) as being the entity
responsible for communicating with Mobile Stations in a certain area. The radio
equipment of a BSS may support one or more cells. A BSS may consist of one or more
base stations where an Abis-interface is implemented. It consists of one Base Station
Controller (BSC) and one or more Base Transceiver Station (BTS). The BSC is a
network component o f the PLMN with the functionality of controlling one or more BTS
and a BTS is a network component that serves one cell.

The Gateway MSC (GMSC):
If the fixed network cannot interrogate the HLR in the case of an incoming call to the
PLMN, the call is routed to an MSC. This MSC will interrogate the appropriate HLR and
route the call to the MSC where the MS is located. The MSC which performs a routing
function to the actual location of the MS is called the GMSC. The network operator
decides if one MSC or all MSCs are to be designated as a GMSC.
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The SMS Gateway MSC (SMSGMSC):
This is the interface between the Mobile Network and the network that provides access to
the short Message services center, for short messages to be delivered to the MS. Again, it
is the choice o f the network operator on which MSCs (one or all) to act as the
SMSGMSC.

The Group Call Register (GCR):
The GCR is a database in charge of the management of attributes related to the
establishment o f Voice Broadcast Calls and Voice Group Calls. The GCR may be
responsible for one or more MSCs. Each MSC involved in a voice group or broadcast call
requests its proper voice group or broadcast call attributes from its related GCR by use of
the voice group or broadcast call reference.

The Equipment Identity Register (EIR):
This is a database in charge of the management of the equipment identities of the MSs.

The Authentication Center (AuC):
This is associated with an HLR, and stores an identity key for each mobile subscriber
registered with the associated HLR. This key is used to generate data that is used to
authenticate the IMSI, and to cipher communication over the radio path between the
mobile station and the network. The AuC communicates only with its associated HLR
over the H-interface.
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The Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN), shown in Figure 14, shows the basic
configuration. In this figure the most general solution is described in order to define all
the possible interfaces which can be found in any PLMN [34].

The specific implementation in each network may be different. Some functions may be
implemented in the same equipment and some interfaces may become internal interfaces.
In any case, the configuration o f the PLMN must have no impact on the relationship with
other PLMNs [34].

In Figure 14, all functions are considered implemented in different equipment. So all the
interfaces are external and need the support of the MAP of the Signaling System No. 7 to
exchange data necessary to support the mobile service.

Since the configuration of a

PLMN has no impact on any other PLMN, the signaling interfaces can be used between
entities within a PLMN and between different PLMNs.

There are a number of interfaces as shown in the figure, some of which will be
introduced in the following segment.
•

Interface between the HLR and the VLR ( D-interface): This interface is used to
exchange the data related to the location of an MS and to manage the subscriber.
The main service provided to the subscriber is the ability to set up or receive calls
within the whole service area. The VLR informs the HLR on the registration of an
MS managed by the latter and provides it with the relevant location information.
The HLR sends to the VLR all the data needed to support the service to the MS.
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The HLR then calls the previous VLR to inform it that it can cancel the location
registration o f this station because of the roaming of the mobile. Exchanges of
data may also occur if the mobile wants to change some data attached to its
subscription or if a specific function is requested.
•

Interface between the HLR and the gsmSCF (J interface). The interface is used by
the gsmSCF to request information from the HLR and since support for this
interface is a network operator option, the HLR may refuse to provide the
information requested.

• Interface between the VLR and its associated MSC(s) (B-interface): The VLR is
the location and management database for the MSs roaming in the area controlled
by the associated MSC(s). When an MSC needs data related to a given MS
currently located in its area, it interrogates the VLR. When the MS initiates a
location update procedure with an MSC, the MSC informs the associated VLR
which stores the relevant information in its tables. This procedure occurs when a
mobile roams to another location area or if the subscriber activates a specific
supplementary service or modifies some data attached to a service. The MSC
transfers (via the VLR) the request to the HLR which stores these modifications
and updates the VLR if needed.
• Interface between VLRs ( G-interface): The VLR fetches the IMSI from the
previous VLR when an MS initiates a location updating procedure using a TMSI.
•

Interface between HLR and the MSC (C-interface): The gateway MSC has to
interrogate the HLR of the called subscriber to obtain the roaming number of the
called MS if the fixed network is unable to do so. To forward a short message to a
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mobile subscriber, the SMS Gateway MSC has to interrogate the HLR to obtain
the MSC number where the MS is located.
•

Interface between MSCs (E-interface): When an MS moves from one MSC
covered area to the next during a call, a handover procedure has to be performed
in order to continue the communication. So the MSCs involved have to be able to
exchange data to initiate and then to realize the operation. This interface is also
used to forward short messages.

•

Interface between the MSC and the Base Station Systems (A-interface): This
interface carries information concerning BSS management, call handling, and
location management.

•

Interface between MSC and EIR (F-interface): This interface is used in case an
MSC needs to verify an IMEI. This is an internal interface.

4.3. NETWORK FUNCTIONS
There are a few network functions available that are required to support cellular
operation. They are Location Registration, Handover, and Call Re-establishment. There
are also additional network functions for call handling, for example, queuing, off-air-callset-up, security related services, discontinuous reception, and discontinuous transmission.

Location Registration: is a way for PLMNs to keep track of their MSs in the system
area. Location information is stored in functional units called location registers. Two of
these registers that are of interest to us are the Home Location Register (HLR) and the
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Visitor Location Register (VLR). Procedures related to location registration comprise of
the following: [45]
i. Location updating which enables the MS to inform the network that its location
area has to be updated, i.e. the MS has received a location area identity which is
different from that contained in its memory.

In order to avoid unnecessary

updating, the current location area identity should be stored in a non-volatile
memory in the MS;
ii. Location cancellation which is used to delete an MS from a VLR;
iii. Periodic location updating which enables the location of stationary MSs to be
confirmed at a rate determined by the operator;
iv. As a network option, IMSI detach/attach operation. When a MS has informed the
network that it is IMSI detached, the network is aware that the subscriber is not
active;
v. Routing updating which enables the MS to inform the network that its routing
area has to be updated;
vi. Periodic routing updating which enables the location of stationary MSs to be
confirmed at a rate determined by the operator;
vii. GPRS detach/attach operation. When a MS has informed the network that it is
GPRS detached, the network is aware that the subscriber is not active;
viii. Cell updating which enables the MS to inform the network that its cell has been
updated.
The procedures i) to iv) are defined for circuit switched services, and ii) and v) to viii) are
defined for packet switched services. Combined procedures for circuit switched and
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packet switched services are also defined for GPRS. The procedure i) may be combined
with v), iii) may be combined with vi) and iv) may be combined with vii).

Handover: Some cases that are required include handover between physical channels of
the same Base Station System (BSS). This may be used when the physical channel
carrying the call comes across interferences and when the channel or equipment carrying
a call has to be taken out o f service for repair or maintenance. Another case is handover
between the BSSs of the same MSC or between BSSs o f different MSCs of the same
PLMN. The former case is used in order to ensure continuity of a connection as the MS
moves from one BSS area to the next. For the case o f handover between BSSs of
different MSCs, two procedures are defined: basic handover procedure where the call is
handed over from the controlling MSC (MSC-A) to another MSC (MSC-B), and
subsequent handover procedure where the call is handed over from MSC-B to MSC-A or
to a third MSC (MSC-B’).

Call reestablishment: This process is performed when a traffic channel (TCH) has been
lost during the call (e.g. when a handover was not completed in time). Call re
establishment is only performed on TCHs and only when a call is in the connected state.

Other network functions like queuing of MS originating and/or MS terminating calls at
the BSS in addition to normal call handling queuing is feasible under the condition that
for MS terminating calls the queuing does not conflict with abnormal release conditions
in the fixed network. In general, calls that may have passed international circuits should
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not be queued. OfT-Air-Call-Set-Up (OACSU) may be implemented in PLMNs in order
to increase the call handling capacity of the PLMN. Security related services are offered
on the radio path by PLMNs:
•

Confidentiality o f the user identity: for the privacy of the identity of the
subscribers. An intruder cannot identify which subscriber is using a certain
resource on the radio path [45] since a temporary identity is used instead of the
IMSI. In circuit switched circuits, the TMSI is a local number valid only in a
given location area. The TMSI is allocated by the VLR and is sent to the MS in a
ciphered mode (when available as a network option). As for packet switched
networks, the packet temporary mobile subscriber identity (P-TMSI) is a local
number valid only in a given routing area. It is allocated by SGSN and sent in
ciphered mode when available.

•

User data confidentiality: provides confidentiality of anything transmitted on a
traffic channel using encryption/decryption in the MS and BSS with a key that is
calculated in both the MS and the network.

•

Signaling information element confidentiality: provides confidentiality of
anything transmitted on a signaling channel where signaling information to
control the service offered to a subscriber or connectionless user data can be
encrypted/decrypted in the MS and BSS with a key calculated by both the MS and
the network.

•

Discontinous reception: is a way of reducing battery consumption of MSs. This
function must be supported by the network but is optional for MSs.
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•

Discontinous transmission: is a technique used to reduce overall interference level
on the radio interface and to reduce MS battery consumption.
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5. OSI REFERENCE MODEL OBJECT DESCRIPTION
Section 5.1 of this chapter presents the formal object model o f the Open Systems
Interconnection Reference Model (OSI-RM). A MODSIM simulation of this model is
shown in Section 5.2, along with a description o f how a layer is implemented. Finally,
Section 5.3 shows the generalized PVS code structure used for the application of formal
methods to the model.

5.1. THE FORMAL OBJECT MODEL
An object model is thought of as a unifying concept. It helps us cope with the complexity
inherent in many different systems. It offers a number of benefits that other models don't
provide, such as re-use. An object model allows for re-use of parts or whole designs,
leading to the creation of re-usable application frameworks. Also, using an object model
produces a stable system built using stable intermediate forms. Thus, a system need not
be completely redesigned in response to a minor or major change in requirements. Only
the affected objects need to be dealt with at that point. Figure 15 shows the object model
developed for the OSI-RM.
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ObjID
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Figure 15. Abstract formal object model of the OSI reference model

There are four objects portrayed in this model:
• a Station object which resembles an open system consisting of a number of
layers specified by the user,
• a Layer object that has a Layer lD to identify which layer it is and a
Station ID to identify which station it belongs to,
• an SAP object responsible for the actual connection between two adjacent
layers, and
•

a Physical connect object that acts as the Physical Layer in the OSI_RM and
connects two or more systems together.
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The model focuses on the behavior of the communication within the OSI-RM, separating
it from the implementation. Figure 16 shows an abstract view of two adjacent layer
objects in the OSI-RM. The details of the layer objects will be discussed in more detail
later. The Shell is where the protocol simulation code is placed.

LayerObj N+l
Shell

LayerObj N

Shell

Figure 16. An abstract formal object view of two adjacent layers in the OSI-RM

5.2. SIMULATION OF THE OBJECT MODEL USING MODSIM
A use of the object model is demonstrated in the development of a simple network
simulation in the object oriented simulation language MODSIM. The interconnectivity
of the object architecture is demonstrated by passing messages, while no specific protocol
is tested.

A network is created using a number of systems (stations). Each system

contains layers where each layer is connected to one or more layers (in this case, one
layer above and one below). Each layer is also connected to one or more Service-Access-
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Points (SAP). The type of connection (either connection_mode or connectionlessjnode)
is decided upon by the data packet passing through the system. If the mode is
connection_mode, the SAP retains the knowledge o f the data packet being sent and
remains connected to the specified path awaiting its return. In the connectionlessjnode,
the connection made between two layers via the SAP is discarded as soon as the data
packet passes through. The maximum number of SAPs to be used in the simulation is
decided upon by the user. The Physical connect object is used to simulate communication
through the physical medium. Each layer is connected to zero or one such link.

Figure 17 shows partial code in MODSIM to create the network where Sarr is the array o f
stations and Parr, is the physical layer connection between these stations.

NE W (SArr, l..s);
FOR i:= 1 TO s
N E W (S A r r [i]);
ASK SArr[i] TO SetStationID(i,n) ;
END FOR;
N E W (PArr, 1..s , 1..s );
FOR i := 1 TO s
FOR j := 1 TO S
IF i<>j
N E W (PArr[i] [j]);
ASK PArr[i][j] TO SetPhysConnectID(SArr[i],SArr[j]);
END IF;
END FOR;
END FOR;

Figure 17. Network creation in MODSIM

The assumptions made in this simulation are that all the systems are physically connected
to one another. Also a maximum number o f SAPs has to be specified at the beginning o f
the simulation (for practical implementation issues). Since this is an abstract model
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simulation and there is no real protocol simulated, a pre-set delay has been added for an
object passing through each layer to try and simulate the passage of time as it would be if
a protocol existed.

Figure 18 shows how the layer object was modeled for simulation in MODSIM. The
layer object has five methods, the purpose of which is to transfer a data object from one
end of the open system to the other. Four methods are used to receive a data object from
above or below and to transmit the data object up or down. These four methods interact
with the SAP objects that acquire or deliver the data object. Depending on whether the
communication is intended to be connection-mode or connectionlessjnode, the SAP
assigns itself to the data object as connect-mode or no-connect-mode. If the mode is
connect-mode, the data packet being sent is returned to the originating station via the
same path used to send it. There is a fifth method called the shell method. This is the
method that will be programmed by the user to contain the entities and functions needed
for a particular protocol simulation.
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Figure 18. Layer approach

So, using this model, the user need only program the contents of the subsystem (shown in
Figure 19) for each layer into the communication framework and the message passing
between the open systems is guaranteed.
TELL METHOD Shell (IN U D :UpDownType;IN X : AnyObject) ;
BEGIN
WAIT DURATION 4.0
END WAIT;
IDA:=UD;
IF IDA = u
TELL SELF TO TransmitD(DArr[X.ObjID]);
ELSE
TELL SELF TO TransmitU(DArr[X.ObjID]);
END IF;
END METHOD;

Figure 19. Sub-system code (Shell Method)

Appendix A contains the MODSIM code for this simulation. Along with the code, is a
text file that contains the simulation scenario. Any change needed in the testing of this
simulation may be done in this text file.
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Figure 20 shows a simulation result for the transmission of six data packets through the
Formal Model, some of which were in connection mode (the packet returns to its
originating station).

Simulation of Data Objects through the OSI Formal
Model
- * - •
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Figure 20. Simulation of six data packets through the OSI Formal Model

S3 CAPTURING THE OBJECT MODEL IN PVS
As mentioned in Chapter 2, a validation model is a formal model that defines the
interactions of processes in a system. It does not resolve implementation details nor does
it say how a message is to be transmitted, encoded, or sorted. By simplifying the problem
in this way, we eliminate disturbing detail, avoid premature commitment to
implementation, and focus on the essence of the problem at hand [26]. This idea of
abstraction is achieved using object orientation, and formal techniques provide the means
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to precisely describe such abstractions[30]. Validation of open system communication, be
it protocol specification or network communication, can thus be achieved horizontally
versus vertically as shown in Figure 21.

Specification
Layer A 1
Implementation
(interface)

B

Layer B1

Layer A2
Horizontal
Verification
vs
Vertical
Verification

ii
D

Layer B2

Figure 21. Horizontal vs vertical verification of communication

The horizontal communication between the layers is used to define the specification of
the network and its desired behavior. The vertical communication defines the
implementation of the network via the interaction between layers. The relationship
between two adjacent layers can be verified by verifying
A1 —> A2 = A1 —»B l, Bl —» B2, B2 —> A2

(1)

where an initial assumption is made that the Bl - » B2 virtual communication is valid. Or
it can be seen as
A=B+C +D

(2)

This approach was decided upon in order to focus on the structure, which helps minimize
re-proving.
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A generalized PVS code structure is composed of a function for each layer entity ( in this
case there is only one entity per layer). This function accepts the record ‘state’ as an input
and relevant layer protocol implementation code would be inserted by the user based on
the protocol being implemented.

statetype: TYPE =
[#
MS: MS_state,
NET: NET_state
I
#]
MS_state: TYPE =
[#
LayerA 1 entitytype: A type,
Layer B 1 entitytype: B type,
SAP: B S A P t y p e

n

NET_state: TYPE =
[#
Layer_A2_entity_type: A type,
Layer_B2_entity_type: B type,
SAP: B SAP type

n

Atype: TYPE =
[#
SAP: A_NET_SAP_type,

B_type: TYPE =
[#
SAP: B A SAP type,

«]
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Layer A 1_entity(s:state_type): state_type= ( )
Layer_A2_entity(s:state_type): state_type= ( )
Layer_Bl_entity(s:state_type): state_type=( )
Layer_B2_entity(s:state_type): state_type= ( )
Single_step(s: state_type): state_type=
(Layer_A 1_entity(Layer_B 1_entity(
Layer_B2_entity(Layer_A2_entity(Initial_state(s)))))
state(s:state_type): RECURSIVE state_type=
IF n(s)=0 THEN single_step(s)
ELSE
state(single_step(s WITH [(n):= n(s)-l]))
ENDIF
MEASURE n(s)
Communication_spec(s:state_type): state_type=state(s)
Communication_imp(s:state_type): state_type= statel(s)
Communication_correct: LEMMA
Communication_imp(InitiaI_state(s»=
Communication_spec(Initial_state(s))

The communication between the layers’ entities is achieved via the SAPs. For PVS
implementation issues, these SAPs are a part of the state record. In the state record, there
are two records, one for the MS side and the other for the Network side. Each side in
turn is a record that contains records of the entities available for that side (in this case two
layers, A and B). They also contain the SAP that connects Layers B to either the layer
below or to the corresponding Layer B on the other side. The A_type and B_type records
contain information about the SAP that connects that layer to the one above. It may also
contain any other information relevant to the protocol implementation in PVS (e.g., state
labels if the entity is a state machine). The single_step function calls the relevant entities
in the implementation order (A1

B1

B2

A2). There is also the state function
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which contains a recursive loop that keeps calling the single_step function to satisfy a
specific call request A similar set of specifications are to be used for the specification
part (A1 -> A2) and these are used in the final communication proof stating that the
communication along the horizontal path is equivalent to the communication along the
vertical path.
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6. GSM RADIO INTERFACE LAYER 3 (RIL3)

6.1. INTRODUCTION
The Radio Interface Layer 3 [32] of the GSM protocol is presented as a protocol on
which the work presented here can be applied. RIL3 is a protocol that deals with all
aspects of radio signaling within the GSM network like channel allocation, connection
and release. It also deals with call establishment and release via its Call control
management sublayer. In this chapter, we will be using a segment of the R1L3 protocol
which establishes the connection for a Mobile Originated Call Setup. This protocol will
be specified and verified in PVS.

6.2. RADIO INTERFACE LAYER 3 (RIL3) DESCRIPTION
The Radio Interface Layer 3 is composed of three sub-layers: Radio Resource (RR),
Mobility Management (MM), and Call Control Management (CCM). The RR sub-layer
together with the Data Link Layer (Layer2) and the Physical Layer (Layer 1), provide the
means for point to point radio connection on which the MM and CCM messages are
carried. The CCM sub-layer is composed of three entities, the Call Control entity (CC),
the Supplementary Services entity (SS), and the Short Message Services entity (SMS).
Only the CC entity is of interest to us for the example used in our PVS proof. The RR
protocol applies to the Air (Um) interface while the MM and CC interfaces apply
between the MS and the MSC.
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The sub-layers have functions and protocols related to a common concept that is best
explained using an object-oriented approach. The management of the RR connection
deals with establishing, modifying, and releasing basic means of communication on the
radio interface and through the radio sub-system. For the purposes of this research,
communication on the RR sub-layer level is assumed to be guaranteed.

63. RIL3 SUBLAYER COMMUNICATION STRUCTURE
Figure 22 provides an overview of the object oriented structure of the Layer 3 RR sub
layer. The RR sub-layer provides a service to the MM sub-layer. RR services are used
for:
•

establishing control channel connections

•

releasing control channel connections

•

control data transfer

•

establishing traffic channel connection

•

ciphering mode indication
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MS Side

Network Side

MM sub-layer

RR-Primitives

RR-Primitives

RR-SAP

RR-SAP

RR sub-layer
RR sub-layer
peer-to-peer
protocol

Figure 22. MM-RR sub-layer communicatioa (33|2

The MM sub-layer provides services to the CC, SS, and SMS entities in the CCM sub
layer. Figure 23 shows the relevant connection structure.
MS Side

CC

Network Side

CC

SMS

<:> <:> <:>

MM-Primitives
MMxx-SAP

SS

SMS

<:> <:> <:>

MM sub-layei

MM sub-layer

peer-to-peer
protocol

Figure 23. CCM-MM sub-layer communication [33|3

2-3 “© E T S I1999. further use, modification, redistribution is strictly prohibited. ETSI standards are
available from publication@etsi.fr, and http://www.etsi.org/eds/eds.htm
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Figure 24. Overall communication structure for layer 3 messaging

The overall structure o f the layer 3 communication is shown in Figure 24. It can be seen
that there exists Service Access Points (SAPs) between adjacent sub-layers to facilitate
communication between the sub-layers and also between the MS and Network CC enities
of the CCM sub-layers and the entity itself (e.g., Mobile telephone and actual circuitry in
the MSC). These SAPs contain routing functions that enable them to decide whether a
message is to be passed right through to the next sub-layer or remain in the sub-layer for
further processing.
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6.4. FORMAL VERIFICATION OF THE PROTOCOL USING PVS
An alteration to Figure 24 was perceived to apply the concept presented in Chapter 5 to
the RIL3 sub-layer communication. Communication on the RR level is assumed to be
correct and the PVS implementation deals with the MM and CCM (CC entity) sub-layers
only. This is shown in Figure 25.

MS Side

Network Side

CC-Primitives

CC-Primitives

MNCC-SAP

MNCC-SAP

CC entity

MM-Primitives

MM-Primitives

MMCC-SAP <

IMCC-SAP

MM sub-layer
MM sub-layer
peer-to-peer
protocol

V R R -S A P

Figure 25. Model for PVS Implementation of the communication between RIL3 sub-layers
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In the PVS implementation, the RR-SAP is implemented but only to provide a guaranteed
communication so the MM sub-layer peer-to-peer protocol shown above would be valid.
An example of a Mobile Originated Call Set-up procedure was used for the application of
this concept. Figure 26 shows the call set-up procedure using the three sub-layers.
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Figure 26. Mobile originated call setup - successful case (33)4

4 “© ETSI 1999. further use, modification, redistribution is strictly prohibited. ETSI standards are available
from publication@etsi.fr, and http://www.etsi.org/eds/eds.htm
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6.4.1. RIL3 sub-layer functionality
As mentioned, Layer 3 of the GSM Network is composed of three sub-layers. Each sub
layer is thought of as a State Machine that has input messages coming in from the SAP
belonging to the layer above or the layer below and output messages going to the SAPs of
the layer above or the layer below. These state machines are complete state machines
that deal with every possible form of communication within these sub-layers. Not all of
the functionality of the sub-layer state machines is used in Figure 26, and therefore the
state machines used in our implementation were extracted out of the original state
machines in order to fulfill our call setup requirements only. The state machines used for
the CC and MM sub-layers are shown in Section 6.4.3.

The RIL3 ETSI specification [32] provided the state machines for the CC entity in the
CCM sub-layer for both the MS and the Network sides. However, the only state machine
found in the specification for the MM sub-layer was for the MS side.

For the Network

side, all that was found was a list of definitions for the states available in that sub-layer.
So between RIL3 spec [32] and R1L3 general aspects [33], a state machine was deduced
for the MM sub-layer Network side and is presented for this work.

6.4.2. Horizontal Specification Vs Vertical Implementation
Looking back on Chapter 5, to perform a horizontal vs. vertical validation of the model, it
is required that the protocol specification be verified horizontally (specification) vs.
vertically (implementation). To do this, Figure 26 needs to be interpreted in two different
ways where part of the figure’s communication is assumed guaranteed. Figure 27 shows
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the altered MO call setup procedure. Some discrepancies were found when comparing
Figure 26 to the worded description and the state machines for the sub-layers. These
discrepancies were fixed in Figure 27, which is the call setup procedure used for the
application o f our model. The discrepancies were missing messages (MMCC Data
Request (setup), and MNCC Sync Ind) on the MS side. This demonstrates that simply
the act of formally specifying the protocol exposes problems.
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Figure 27. Fixed mobile originated call setup (implementadoa)
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For the implementation view of the procedure, all Data Link Layer communication is
assumed to be valid and messages coming into MM sub-layer are assumed guaranteed.
The specification view on the other hand assumes communication to be valid anywhere
below the CC entity in the CCM sub-layer. This produces the call setup procedure in
Figure 28.
Mobile Station

Network

CC

CC

MNCC-SETUP-REQ
MMCC-ESTREQ

CNF
MMCC-Data-Ri
setup
ICC-CALL-

MNCC5ETUP-IND

Data Ind
Call Proc

Data Reo
Call Proc
ICC-SYNC'"REQ (res ass)
MMCC-SYNC
CNF (res a s s r

* ALERT-ND
MNCCSETUP-CNF

MNCC'ALERT-REQ

Alert

Data Ind
connect

Data Req
connect
Data Ind

u a ja tw ik

connack

MNCCSETUP-REQ
MNCC-SE’
COMPL-IN1
itamsg

DATA R OW

Ftgare 28. MO Call Setap (ipedflcatioa)
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6.43. State machines for the CC and MM sub-layers
The Figures 29 through 32 are the state machines for the CC entity in the CCM sub-layer
and MM sub-layer for both the MS and the Network sides. These are four state machines:

CC-MS state machine(Figure 29): deals with the input messages coming in through the
MMCC SAP from the layer below (MM sub-layer) or the MNCC SAP from the network
entity (in this case the actual mobile phone on the Mobile Station side). It may also
produce messages to either the layer above or the layer below.

CC-NET state machine(Figure 30): deals with the input messages coming in through
the MMCC SAP from the layer below (MM sub-layer) or the MNCC SAP from the
network entity (in this case the actual MSC on the Network side). It may also produce
messages to either the layer above or the layer below.

MM-MS state machme(Figure 31): deals with the input messages coming in through the
RR SAP from the layer below (RR sub-layer) or the MMCC SAP from the network entity
(MM sublayer on the Mobile Station side). It may also produce messages to either the
layer above or the layer below.

MM-NET state machine(Figure 32): deals with the input messages coming in through
the RR SAP from the layer below (RR sub-layer) or the MMCC SAP from the network
entity (MM sublayer on the Network side). It may also produce messages to either the
layer above or the layer below.

The MM-NET state machine was missing from the RIL3 documentation and a word
description of available states was used in deriving the state machine shown in Figure 32.
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6.5. DESCRIPTION OF PVS CODE
6.5.1. PVS implementation of the state machines
In the PVS implementation o f the state machines, a state record was used that contained
information on the SAPs, the present states and the messages. It was discovered that PVS
had a problem with seeing the change in the record’s present state and input message
during the recursion, so Present state in/out and Message in/out elements had to be added
to enable PVS to see the change,
statetype: TYPE =
i*
x: bool,
MS: MS_state,
NET: NETstate,
n: { i:nat|i<40 & i>=0},
msg_in_MS: SA Pm sg,
msg_in_NET: SAP_msg,
ms g o u t MS : SAP msg,
ms gout NET: SAP_msg,
m s g i n M M M S : SAP msg,
m s g i n M M N E T : SAP msg,
msg_out_MM_MS: SAP msg,
msg out MM NET: SAP_msg,
Pres in MM MS: M M statetype,
Pres out MM MS: MM state type,
Pres_in_MS: CC_state_type,
Pres out MS: C C statety p e,
Pres_in_NET: CC_state_type,
Pres_out_NET: C C sta tety p e,
Pres in MM NET: MM state type,
Pres out MM NET: MM state type
#]
This state record is used as an input to the state transition functions. The reason the state
record contains information about both the MS and the Network sides, is to facilitate the
assumption of communication on the RR level for the implementation and on the MM
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level for the specification. The communication between the state transition functions in
the PVS implementation can be seen in Figure 33 as follows:

CC_state_machine
Jm p

MM_state_machine
______ imp._____

Input_Control

Input_Control
Implementation view

Figure 33. Implementation view for PVS

Figure 34 shows the state transition functions’ view for the PVS specification code. For
the specification, new state transition functions were used where communication coming
from the MM sub-layer is assumed guaranteed.
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CC_state_machine_spec

InputControl

Input_Control
Specification view

Figure 34. Spedfication view for PVS

The data types used are SAP_msg which is an enumerated type of all possible messages
in any of the three sub-layers.
SAP_msg: TYPE = {MNCC_Setup_Req, MNCC_Call_Proc_Ind, MNCC_Alert_Ind,
MNCC_Setup_Cnf, MNCC_Setup_Ind, MNCC_Call_Proc_Req,
MNCC_Alert_Req, MNCC_Setup_Rsp,
MNCC_Setup_Compl_Ind,MNCC_Sync_Ind,
MMCC_Est_Req, MMCC_Est_Cnf, MMCC_Data_Req_setup,
MMCC_Est_Ind_setup, MMCC_Call_Proc,
MMCC_Data_Ind_callproc, MMCC_Data_Req_callproc,
MMCC_Sync_Req, MMCC_Sync_Cnf, MMCC_Sync_Ind,
MMCC_Data_Ind_alert, MMCC_Data_Ind_connect,
MMCC_Data_Req_connack, MMCC_Data_Req_alert,
MMCC_Data_Req_connect, MMCC_Data_Ind_connack,
RR_Est_Req, RR_Est_Cnf, RR_Sync_Ind_ciph,
RR_Sync_Ind_res, RR_Est_Ind, RR_Sync_Req_ciph,
RR_Sync_Req_res, RR_Sync_Cn f_c iph, RR_Sync_Cn f_res,
RR_Data_Req_setup, RR_Data_Ind_cal lproc,
RR_Data_Ind_alert, RR_Data_Ind_connect,
RR_Data_Req_corrnack, RR_Data_Req_alert,
RR_Data_Req_connect, RR_Data_Ind_connack,
RR_Data_Ind_setup, RR_Data_Req_callproc, Data_msg,
No_Msg}
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There are also state types for the MM and the CC sub-layers which are basically all the
relevant states for the example being used.

CC_state_type: TYPE = {Null, MM_Conpend, Call_Init, MO_Call_Proc,
Call_Delivered, Conn_Indic, Active}
MM_state_type: TYPE = {Idle, Wait_MOMM_Conn, Ciph_Mode_Init, Active,
Wait_RR_Conn}

The code is written in a way where it is very easy to increase state types or message types
based on need for any application example. Similarly, the state transition code is written
using IF statements and therefore simplifies any addition needed to the code.

An initial state was assumed to contain initial states for all the sub-layers and to have no
messages on the SAPs.
Initial_state(s:state_type):
s = (s WITH [(NETXCCXPres_s):=Null,
(MSXCC)(Pres_s):=Null,
(NETXMMXPres_s):=Idle,
(MSXMMXPres_s):=Idle,
(NETXCCXSAPXmsg):= No_Msg,
(MSXCCXSAPXmsg):= No_Msg,
(MSXMMXSAPXmsg) := No_Msg,
(NETXMMXSAPXmsg) := No_Msg,
(NETXSAPXmsg):= No_Msg,
(MSXSAPXmsg):= No_Msg,
(msg_in_MS):= No_Msg,
(msg_out_MS):= No_Msg,
(msg_in_NET):= NoM sg,
(m s g o u tN E T ):= No_Msg,
(msg_in_MM_MS):= No_Msg,
(msg_out_MM_MS):= No_Msg,
(msg_in_MM_NET):= No_Msg,
(msg_out_MM_NET):= No_Msg,
(Pres_in_MS):=NulI, (Pres_in_NET):= Null,
(Pres_out_MS):= Null, (Pres_out_NET):= Null,
(Pres_in_MM_MS):= Idle, (Pres_out_MM_MS):= Idle,
(Pres_in_MM_NET):= Idle, (Pres out_MM_NET):= Idle,
(n):=30])
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The control state machine “Input_Contror was used to provide a testing ground for the
whole system. It provides external messages that would normally come from the mobile
phone on the MS side or the circuitry on the Network side. It can be seen from the state
transition diagrams (Figures 29-32) that there exists some states where there is an option
of messages coming in as inputs and each message produces a different state transition
and output. Also, in Figure 28, after the Network side receives the MMCC_Sync_Cnf
message on the MMCC_SAP, one of two messages can be sent, either MNCC_Alert_Req
or MNCC_Setup_Rsp. If the AlertReq message comes first, the CC state changes to
Call-delivered and an

output of MMCC_Data_Req_alert is produced for the

MMCC_SAP. After this alert message a Setup_Rsp message has to be provided to
change the CC state from Call_delivered to Connect_Indic where it awaits the connect
acknowledge message

to go

into Active state and produces an output of

MMCC_Data_Req_connect for the MMCC_SAP.

On the other hand,

if the

MNCC_Setup_Rsp message comes in first, the CC state goes straight from MO Call
Proceeding to Connect_Indic where it awaits the connect acknowledge signal to go into
active state and also produces the output of MMCC_Data_Req_connect for the
MMCC SAP. This condition is implemented in the “Input Control” state machine as a
Boolean variable that produces an Alert Req message followed by a Setup Rsp message
if equal to FALSE and just a Setup_Rsp message if TRUE.

6.5.2. PVS implementation of the state transition functions
Transition through the state machines was done via recursion, a common tool in PVS to
handle sequences of events.

A recursive function steps through the state machines
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calling the next state using the present state and input as parameters. A natural variable n
was used to limit the number of iterations through the recursive function in order to
artificially terminate an infinite process to simplify the proof process.

The recursive function and the single step function used to perform the next state
transition are as follows:
state(s:state_type): RECURSIVE state_type=
IF n(s)=0 THEN single_step(s)
ELSE
state(single_step(s WITH [(n):= n(s)-l]))
ENDIF
MEASURE n(s)

statel(s:state_type): RECURSIVE state_type=
IF n(s)=0 THEN single_stepl(s)
ELSE
statel(single_stepl(s WITH [(n):=n(s)-1]))
ENDIF
MEASURE n(s)

where state deals with the specification communication and statel deals with the
implementation. The single step functions {single step for specification and single_stepl
for implementation) merely call the appropriate state transition functions (CC_MS,
MM_NET and CC_NET for implementation or CC_MS and CC_NET for
specification) while forcing the next state value to be the present state and output
message to be the input message. This can be seen as follows:
% This is a function to perform a single state transition through all
% the state machines for the specification with the present values of s
single_step(s:state_type): state_type=
(state_transition_CC_NET_Spec (
state_transition_CC_MS_Spec (Input_Control (
s WITH [(msg_in_MS):= msg_out_MS(s ), (msg_in_NET):= msg_out_NET(s) ,
(Pres_in_MS):= Pres_out_MS(s),(Pres_in_NET):=
Pres_out_NET(s) ] ,test))))

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

86

%This is a function to perform a single state transition through all
%the state machines for the implementation with the present values of s
single_stepl(s:state_type):
state_type=
(state_transition_CC_NET(
state_transition_MM_NET(
state_transition_MM_MS(
state_transition_CC_MS(Input_Control(s WITH [ (msg_in_MS):=
msg_out_MS(s ),
(msg_in_NET):= msg_out_NET (s ),
(msg_in_MM_MS) := msg_out_MM_MS (s ) ,
(msg_in_MM_NET) := msg_out_MM_NET (s ) ,
(Pres_in_MS):= Pres_out_MS(s ),
(Pres_in_MM_MS):= Pres_out_MM_MS(s ),
(Pres_in_NET):= Pres_out_NET(s),
(Pres_in_MM_NET) := Pres_out_MM_NET (s )]
,test ))))))

It can be seen from the code that all the messages in/out and present states in/out are
changed once at the beginning of the call and all the state transition functions are called
using this single change so that all the state machines are actually considered to be
working independently of each other.

The state transition functions are implemented such that in any given state, if the message
coming into the appropriate SAP is invalid, the function re-produces the state record
without changes. This functionality takes care of the conditions of what happens if the
state machine is in the correct state but it gets an incorrect message input or if it gets a
correct input but is in the wrong state. In reality, on entrance to each state, a timer is
started and, if the correct message does not arrive within the allotted time, the state
machine reverts to it’s initial condition and an appropriate error message is produced.
This timer is not implemented in our PVS example due to the complication of real time
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implementation in PVS and due to the fact that it is not of importance for relaying the
main aspect of this research.

6.6. FORMAL PROOF OF PVS CODE
The first step in formally proving the protocol performs the expected function is to
typecheck the code.

Typechecking ensures that there are no semantic errors such as

undeclared names and ambiguous types. On typechecking the code in Appendix B, some
Type Check Conditions (TCCs) occurred, two of which the prover could not prove
automatically. Therefore, two LEMMAs were written to fulfill those two TCC
obligations namely,
statel_TCCl: LEMMA
FORALL(s:state_type):
NOT n(s)=0 IMPLIES n(single_stepl(s WITH [(n):= n(s)-l])) < n(s)

state_TCC3: LEMMA
FORALL (s:state_type):
NOT n(s)=0 IMPLIES n(single_step(s WITH [(n):= n(s)-!]))< n(s)

State 1TCC1 ensures that the recursive measure n approaches its final value 0 so that the
function terminates. Similarly, state_TCC3 ensures that the function terminates. Some
intermediate LEMMAs were created to facilitate the proof of the above LEMMAs; these
are shown below for the implementation communication. These LEMMAs basically go
through each state transition and prove that the function terminates.
st_tran_CC_MS: LEMMA
FORALL (n:nat):
NOT n(s)= 0 IMPLIES n(state_transition_CC_MS(Input_Control(
s WITH [(n):=n(s)-l].test)))< n(s)
state_TCC_intl: LEMMA
FORALL (n:nat) :
NOT n(s)=0 IMPLIES
n (state_transition_MM_MS (state_transition_CC_MS (Input_Control (s
WITH [(n):=n(s)-l].test))))<n(s)
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3tate_TCC_int2: LEMMA
FORALL(n:nat) :
NOT n(s)=0 IMPLIES
n (state_transition_MM_NET (state_transition_MM_MS (state_transition
_CC_MS(Input_Control(s WITH [(n):=n(s)-1], test)))))<n(s)
state_TCC_int3: LEMMA
FORALL (n:nat):
NOT n(s)=0 IMPLIES
n (state_transition_CC_NET (state_transition_MM_NET (state_transitio
n_MM_MS (state_transition_CC_MS (
Input_Control(s WITH [(n):= n(s)-1],test))))))<n(s)

and for the specification communication:
st_tran_CC_MS_spec: LEMMA
FORALL (n:nat):
NOT n(s)= 0 IMPLIES n(state_transition_CC_MS_Spec(Input_Control (
s WITH [(n):=n(s)-l],test)))< n(s)
state_TCC_intl_Spec: LEMMA
FORALL (n:nat):
NOT n(s)=0 IMPLIES
n (state_transition_CC_NET_Spec (state_transition_CC_MS_Spec (
Input_Control(s WITH [(n):=n(s)1] ,test))))<n(s)

The main communication of the system had to be proved via a LEMMA stating that the
specification communication (i.e. using the CC only) produces the same final state as the
implementation communication (i.e. using CC and MM). The communication
specification is the virtual communication going across and the communication
implementation is the actual communication link going down the layered structure, across
then up.
Communication_spec(s:state_type): state_type=state(s)

Communication_imp(s:state_type): state_type= statel(s)
Communication_correct: LEMMA
Communication_imp (Initial_state(s )) =
Coirmunication_spec (Initial_state (s ))
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To perform the proofs, a series of (rewrite) and (smash) commands were applied at
appropriate instances. Both TCC LEMMAs and the communication LEMMA were
proved. The proof is shown in Appendix C. It can be seen that these proofs are quite
simple but repetitive and tedious. PVS allows automation for this type of proof where a
pre-defined proof strategy is used which in turn simplifies re-proving due to any change
made in the specification.
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7. CONCLUSION

An abstract object-oriented formal model of the Open Systems InterconnectionReference Model (OSI-RM) [1] was presented to support the development of simulations
and formal methods applied to layered network protocols. It is a re-usable model that has
successfully been applied to simulation by simulating the communication between the
layers in an abstract manner. It has also been applied to formal methods by formally
specifying a Global Systems for Mobile Communications (GSM) protocol and verifying
communication with the layered structure.

7.1. BENEFITS OF THE FORMAL OBJECT MODEL
One of the recognized strengths of the object-oriented paradigm is that a common core of
basic ideas can support modeling at all levels of abstraction [13]. The information hiding
principle is naturally supported; at the informal level of description, the concept of an
object is very common. A design description and implementation framework supporting
this concept would lead to more readable specifications, and properties, which are
defined for general types of objects, can be inherited by objects in a sub-class.

Formal methods gain from object-oriented engineering concepts since it makes
mathematical models easier to handle. On the other hand formal description techniques
enhance the understanding o f the object-oriented models. This is due to the un-ambiguity
of the formal specification process, which also promotes the concept of re-use o f model
components.
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There are a few advantages from taking an object-oriented approach in simulation. These
include the naturally supported information hiding principle, simplification of the
computer programming tasks achieved through the fact that each object is responsible for
a specific task; also object oriented designs reduce the risk of building complex systems
since they are developed to evolve incrementally from smaller ones and yield smaller
systems through the re-use of common mechanisms.

The model focuses on the behavior of the communication within the OSI-RM, separating
it from the implementation. The concept of abstraction used in the model assists in the
avoidance of pre-mature commitment to protocol detail and enables structure re-use and
verification of communication within the structure.

7.2. APPLICATION OF THE OBJECT MODEL TO SIMULATION
The object model was simulated using MODSIM III, modeling the communication
between the layers. This application proved successful through the simulation of several
scenarios that were tested using connection mode and connectionless_mode to show
successful communication between stations throughout the network.

An abstract

approach was used by not applying the model to a particular protocol and a set time delay
was inserted to portray the effect o f a protocol being implemented. This way, protocol
designers may use this model for protocol simulation focusing more on the problem at
hand while guaranteeing communication within the layered structure.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

92
73. APPLICATION OF THE OBJECT MODEL TO FORMAL METHODS
PVS was used to show the applicability of the object model to formal methods by
formally specifying and verifying a GSM protocol. The abstract design o f the model
allowed us to remove unnecessary detail not pertaining to communication issues and
hence simplify the proof. This application of the model to a GSM protocol has proved to
be successful in two aspects. The first was showing the existence o f discrepancies
between the worded specifications [32, 33] and the fact that an important figure of the
MM-NET state machine was missing. The second aspect was that the communication
was verified using the abstract formal model structure of the OSI Reference Model.

7.4. GSM DISCREPANCIES
Although the worded description of the available states (not the functionality of the
machine) was present in the documentation, the lack presence of the MM-NET state
machine figure would lead to the an increased difficulty in the implementation of this
layer protocol. The state machine was deduced using other available state machines (that
dealt with multiple layers) and the worded description to enable the performance of this
research. Other discrepancies found were mainly messages that would be sent over the
communication link that were present in the worded specification [32] and not in the
Mobile Network Arrow diagram [33] of the Mobile Originated Call Setup procedure
which was the protocol segment used. Many other discrepancies were found in the
naming o f states and entities going from one specification to the next as well as
differences in the general layout of state machines within one document [32].
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7.5. FINAL COMMENTS
Formal methods have been seen in the past as being somewhat difficult and time
consuming. This research shows the need for the formal specification of all
communication protocols to support a clear understanding of these protocols and to
provide consistency in their implementations. Combining object oriented techniques with
formal methods in the development o f the formal object model allowed for the re-use of
this model when applied to any layered network structure. This was shown in the
example used where GSM is a three layer network structure as opposed to the seven layer
structure of the OSI-RM. It was also shown that formal specifications identify most
discrepancies like omissions and inconsistencies in the requirements statements. Proofs
only need to be applied to sensitive areas of the design where problem areas may arise.
Simulation becomes easier to build for the study of timing issues when using a common
model given the limitations of formal methods.
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APPENDIX A
(MODSIM SIMULATION CODE)
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{ *************
File: MNetwork.mod
Created: May 31st, 2000
Modified:
Written b y : Rasha
Purpose: Main Program File.
* * * * * * * * * * * * *

}
MAIN MODULE Network;
FROM
FROM
FROM
FROM
FROM
FROM
FROM
FROM

DataObject
Layer
Test
Station
PhysConnect
SAPMod
SimMod
IOMod

IMPORT
IMPORT
IMPORT
IMPORT
IMPORT
IMPORT
IMPORT
IMPORT

AnyObject,DArr;
LayerObj;
TestObj;
StationObj,SArr;
PhysConnectObj,PArr;
SAPObj;
SimTime, StartSimulation, StopSimulation;
ReadKey, StreamObj,FileUseType(Input);

VAR
X: AnyObject;
L : LayerObj;
T: TestObj;
S : StationObj;
inputfile:StreamObj;
LayerlD, StationID, DestID,n ,s ,i ,j,k, connectMode: INTEGER;
ch:CHAR;
textline : STRING;
time:REAL;

BEGIN
NEW(T) ;
NEW(inputfile);
ASK inputfile TO Open( "network_data.txt",

Input);

FOR i := 1 TO 5
ASK inputfile TO ReadLine(textline);
END FOR;
OUTPUT;
ASK inputfile TO ReadLine(textline);
OUTPUT(textline);
OUTPUT;
OUTPUT;
ASK inputfile TO ReadLine(textline);
ASK inputfile TO ReadLine(textline);
ASK inputfile TO Readlnt(s);
OUTPUT ("The number of stations used is : ", s) ;
ASK inputfile TO ReadLine(textline);
ASK inputfile TO ReadLine(textline);
ASK inputfile TO Readlnt(n);
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OUTPUTCThe number of layers per station is : ", n) ;
ASK inputfile TO ReadLine (textline) ;
ASK inputfile TO ReadLine (textline) ;
ASK inputfile TO Readlnt(k);
OUTPUT ("The number of objects to be sent is : ", k);
ASK inputfile TO ReadLine (textline) ;
ASK inputfile TO ReadLine (textline) ;
N E W (DArr, l..k);
N E W (SArr, 1..S);
FOR i:= 1 TO s
N E W (SArr[i ]);
ASK SArr[i] TO SetStationlD(i.n);
END FOR;
N E W (PArr, l..s, l..s);
FOR i:= 1 TO s
FOR j := 1 TO s
IF i o j
N E W (PArr[i] [j] ) ;
ASK PArr[i] [j] TO SetPhysConnectID (SArr [i] ,SArr [j ]) ;
END IF;
END FOR;
END FOR;
FOR i:= 1 TO k
ASK
ASK
ASK
ASK
ASK
ASK
ASK

inputfile
inputfile
inputfile
inputfile
inputfile
inputfile
inputfile

TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO

ReadLine(textline);
Readlnt(LayerlD);
Readlnt(StationID);
Readlnt(DestID);
Readlnt (connectMode) ;
ReadReal(time);
ReadLine(textline);

NEW(DArr[i]);
ASK DArr[i] TO SetAnyObjID(LayerlD, StationID,DestID, i, StationID)
ASK DArr[i] TO SetObj ConnectMode (connectMode) ;
TELL T TO TestComm(DArr[i] ,SArr [StationID] .LArr [LayerlD] ) IN time;
OUTPUT;
OUTPUT("For Object ", DArr[i] .ObjID, * : SimTime is : ", time, "
Connect mode is : ", connectMode , "
(1 - Connect ; 2 - No
Connect)");
ASK DArr[i] TO DisplaylDs();
OUTPUT;
END FOR;
StartSimulation;
OUTPUT;
OUTPUT("DONE" ) ;
OUTPUT(“... .Hit Any Key to terminate") ;
ch:=ReadKey;
END MODULE.
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{

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

File: DAnyObj ect.mod
Created: May 31st, 2000
Modified:
Written by: Rasha
Purpose: Create an AnyObject definition File, this will be
interpreted as a data object in the future

********+****

DEFINITION MODULE DataObject;
FROM SAPMod IMPORT SAPObj;
VAR
DArr: ARRAY INTEGER OF AnyObject;
AnyObject = OBJECT;
LayerlD : INTEGER;
StationID:INTEGER;
DestID, OrigID: INTEGER;
ObjID, SAPID: INTEGER;
connectMode: INTEGER;
ASK
ASK
ASK
ASK
ASK
ASK
ASK
ASK

METHOD
METHOD
METHOD
METHOD
METHOD
METHOD
METHOD
METHOD

ObjInit();
SetAnyObj ID (IN LID, SID, DID, OID, ORID : INTEGER)
SetAnyObjLayerlD(IN LID: INTEGER);
SetAnyObjStationID(IN SID:INTEGER);
DisplaylDs();
SetAnyObjObjID(IN OID: INTEGER);
SetObjConnectMode(IN connectmode: INTEGER);
SetAnyObjSAPID(IN SAPid: INTEGER);

END OBJECT;
END MODULE.
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* * * * * * * * * * * * *

File: IAnyObject.mod
Created: May 31st, 2000
Written by: Rasha
Purpose: Create an AnyObject implementation File, this will be
interpreted as a data object in the future
»***•*»**<
IMPLEMENTATION MODULE DataObject;
OBJECT AnyObject;
ASK METHOD SetAnyOb j ID (IN LID, SID, DID, OID, ORID: INTEGER);
BEGIN
LayerlD:= LID;
StationID:= SID;
DestID:= DID;
Ob j I D := OID;
OrigID:=ORID;
END METHOD;
ASK METHOD SetAnyObj LayerlD (IN LID: INTEGER);
BEGIN
LayerlD:= LID;
END METHOD;
ASK METHOD SetAnyObjStationID(IN SID: INTEGER);
BEGIN
StationID:= SID;
END METHOD;
ASK METHOD DisplayIDs();
BEGIN
OUTPUT("Layer_ID = ", LayerlD,
Dest_ID = ", DestID);
END METHOD;

" , Station_ID = ", StationID,

ASK METHOD SetAnyObjObjID(IN OID: INTEGER);
BEGIN
SELF.ObjID:=ObjID;
END METHOD;
ASK METHOD SetObjConnectMode(IN connectmode: INTEGER);
BEGIN
connectMode:= connectmode;
END METHOD;
ASK METHOD SetAnyObj SAPID (IN SAPid: INTEGER);
BEGIN
SAPID:= SAPid;
END METHOD;
ASK METHOD ObjlnitO;
BEGIN
SAPID:=0;
END METHOD;
END OBJECT;
END MODULE.
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File: DLayer.mod
Created: May 31st, 2000
Modified:
Written by: Rasha
Purpose: Create an AnyObject definition File, this will be
interpreted as a data object in the future
* * * * * * * * * * * * *

}

DEFINITION MODULE Layer;
FROM
FROM
FROM
FROM
FROM

DataObject
SAPMod
Station
Layer
SimMod

IMPORT
IMPORT
IMPORT
IMPORT
IMPORT

AnyObject, DArr;
SAPObj;
StationOb j ;
LayerObj;
SimTime;

TYPE
UpDownType=(u ,d );
LayerObj = OBJECT;
LayerlD, StationID, DestID, OrigID : INTEGER;
X
:AnyObject;
IDA
:UpDownType;
ST
:StationObj;
SAP
:SAPObj ;
ASK
METHOD
TELL METHOD
TELL METHOD
TELL METHOD
TELL METHOD
TELL METHOD
END OBJECT;
END MODULE.

SetLayerlD (IN LID, SID : INTEGER; IN S: StationObj)
ReceiveFromU(IN X : AnyObject);
ReceiveFromD(IN X : AnyObject);
TransmitU(IN X : AnyObject);
TransmitD(IN X : AnyObject);
Shell (IN UD: UpDownType; IN X : AnyObject);
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£

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

File: ILayer.mod
Created: May 31st, 2000
Modified:
Written by: Rasha
Purpose: Create an AnyObject definition File, this will be
interpreted as a data object in the future
*
* * * * * * *
>
IMPLEMENTATION MODULE Layer;
FROM PhysConnect IMPORT PArr;
FROM station
IMPORT SArr;
OBJECT LayerObj;
ASK METHOD SetLayerlD (IN LID, SID : INTEGER; IN S :StationObj);
BEGIN
S T := S;
LayerlD := LID;
StationID := SID;
END METHOD;
TELL METHOD ReceiveFromU(IN X : AnyObject);
VAR
U D : UpDownType;
BEGIN
UD:=u;
IF X <> NILOBJ
ASK DArr[X.ObjID] TO SetAnyObjLayerlD(LayerlD);
OUTPUT(" LayerlD = ", LayerlD," StationID = ", StationID,
" RFU Object ", X.ObjID);
TELL SELF TO Shell(UD,DArr[X.ObjID]);
ELSE
OUTPUT("Object not received in Layer", LayerlD);
END IF;
END METHOD;
TELL METHOD ReceiveFromD(IN X : AnyObject!;
VAR
U D : UpDownType ;
BEGIN
UD:=d;
IF X <> NILOBJ
IF L a y e r l D o l
ASK DArr[X.ObjID] TO SetAnyObjLayerlD(LayerlD) ;
OUTPUT(" LayerlD = ", LayerlD," StationID = ",
StationID, ’ RFD Object ", X.ObjID);
TELL SELF TO Shell(UD,DArr[X.ObjID]);
ELSE
ASK DArr [X.Obj ID] TO SetAnyObjStationID(X.DestID) ;
OUTPUT(" LayerlD = ", LayerlD," StationID = ",
StationID, " RFD Object ", X.ObjID);
TELL SELF TO Shell(UD,DArr[X.ObjID]);
END IF;
ELSE
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OUTPUT("Object not received in Layer", LayerlD);
END IF;
END METHOD;
TELL METHOD TransmitU(IN X ; AnyObject);
VAR
i, DID:INTEGER;
BEGIN
FOR i := 1 TO ST.maxSAPs
IF (X.SAPID=0)
ASK ST.SAP[i] TO SetSAPAnyObjID(X);
ASK DArr [X.ObjID] TO SetAnyOb jSAPID (ST. SAP [i] .SAPID) ;
ELSE
ASK ST. SAP [X. SAPID] TO SetSAPAnyObj ID (DArr [X.ObjID]) ;
END IF;
END FOR;
IF LayerlD <> ST.nl
TELL ST.SAP[X.SAPID] TO
SendUp (ST.LArr[LayerID+1 ] ,D A r r [X .ObjID]) ;
ELSE
OUTPUT;
OUTPUT("Layer7 reached for Object ", X.ObjID, " Connect Mode
: ", X .connectMode, " SimTime ", SimTime () ) ;
OUTPUT;
IF (X .connectMode=1) AND (X.OrigID<>X.DestID)
ASK DArr[X.ObjID] TO
SetAnyObj ID (X .LayerlD,X.StationID,X. OrigID,X .Obj ID,
X.OrigID);
TELL ST.SAP[X.SAPID] TO SendDown(S T .LArr[LayerlD1],DArr[X.ObjID]);
ELSE IF (X.connectMode=l) AND (X.OrigID=X.DestID)
OUTPUT(“Object ", X.ObjID, " was returned to
originating station");
OUTPUT;
END IF;
END IF;
END IF;
END METHOD;

TELL METHOD TransmitD(IN X : AnyObject);
VAR
i:INTEGER;
BEGIN
FOR i := 1 TO ST.maxSAPs
IF (X.SAPID=0)
ASK ST.SAP[i] TO SetSAPAnyObjID(X);
ASK DArr [X.ObjID] TO SetAnyObjSAPID(ST.SAP[i] .SAPID) ;
ELSE
ASK ST.SAP[X.SAPID] TO SetSAPAnyObjID(DArr[X.ObjID] ) ;
END IF;
END FOR;
IF LayerID<>l
TELL ST. SAP [X.SAPID] TO SendDown (ST. LArr [LayerID-
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1],DArr[X.ObjID]);
ELSE
DestID:=X.DestID;
TELL PArr[StationID][DestID] TO
SendAcross (SArr [DestID],DArr[X.ObjID]) ;
END IF;
END METHOD;
TELL METHOD Shell (IN U D :UpDownType;IN X : AnyObject);
BEGIN
WAIT DURATION 4.0
END WAIT;
IDA:=UD;
IF IDA = u
TELL SELF TO TransmitD(DArr[X.ObjID] ) ;
ELSE
TELL SELF TO TransmitUf DArr [X.ObjID] ) ;
END IF;
END METHOD;
END OBJECT;
END MODULE.
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£

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

File: DStation.mod
Created: May 31st, 2000
Modified:
Written by: Rasha
Purpose: Create a Station definition File
* * * * * * * * * * * * *

}

DEFINITION MODULE Station;
FROM DataObject IMPORT AnyObject;
FROM Layer
IMPORT LayerObj ;
FROM SAPMod
IMPORT SAPObj;
VAR
SArr: ARRAY INTEGER OF StationObj;
TYPE
StationObj = OBJECT;
X
: AnyObject;
nl,i,m,n,j, StationID, maxSAPs : INTEGER;
LArr
: ARRAY INTEGER OF LayerObj;
SAP
: ARRAY INTEGER OF SAPObj;

ASK METHOD SetStationID(IN SID, nLayers: INTEGER);
ASK METHOD Create;
END OBJECT;
END MODULE.
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£

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

File: IStation.mod
Created: May 31st, 2000
Modified:
Written by: Rasha
Purpose: Create a Station Implementation File.

•••*******..*

}

IMPLEMENTATION MODULE Station;
OBJECT StationObj;
ASK METHOD SetStationID(IN SID, nLayers: INTEGER);
BEGIN
StationID:= SID;
nl
:= nLayers ;
ASK SELF TO Create;
END METHOD;
ASK METHOD Create;
BEGIN
maxSAPs:=3;
m: =nl-l;
N E W (LArr, l..nl);
NEW(SAP, 1..maxSAPs);
FOR n:= 1 TO nl
NEW(LArr[n]);
ASK LArr[n] TO SetLayerID(n,StationID,SELF);
END FOR;
FOR i := m DOWNTO 1
FOR j := 1 TO maxSAPs
N E W (S A P [j ]);
ASK SAP[j] TO SetSAPID (LArr [i+1] ,LArr [i] , j);
END FOR;
END FOR;
END METHOD;
END OBJECT;
END MODULE.
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File: DSAP.mod
Created:May 31st, 2000
Modified: June 2nd, 2000
Written by: Rasha Morsi
Purpose: Create a Connect definition File.

}
DEFINITION MODULE SAPMod;
FROM DataObject IMPORT AnyObject,DArr;
FROM Layer IMPORT LayerObj;

TYPE
SAPObj = OBJECT;
LT, LF, SAPID, ObjID, connectMode: INTEGER;
X: AnyObject;
LayerFrom, LayerTo: LayerObj;
ASK METHOD SetSAPID(IN LayerFrom, LayerTo: LayerObj; IN SAPid:
INTEGER);
TELL METHOD S e n d U p d N LayerTo: LayerObj; IN X: AnyObject);
TELL METHOD SendDown(IN LayerTo: LayerObj; IN X: AnyObject);
ASK METHOD SetSAPAnyObj ID (IN X: AnyObject);
END OBJECT;
END MODULE.
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.
File: ISAPMod.mod
Created:May 31st, 2000
Modified: June 2nd, 2000
Written by: Rasha Morsi
Purpose: Create a Connect implementation File.

}
IMPLEMENTATION MODULE SAPMod;
OBJECT SAPObj;
ASK METHOD SetSAPID(IN LayerFrom, LayerTo: LayerObj; IN SAPid:
INTEGER);
BEGIN
L F :=LayerFrom.LayerlD;
L T :=LayerTo.LayerlD;
SAPID:=SAPid;
END METHOD;
TELL METHOD S e n d U p d N LayerTo: LayerObj; IN X: AnyObject);
BEGIN
TELL LayerTo TO ReceiveFromD (DArr [X.ObjID]) ;
END METHOD;
TELL METHOD SendDown(IN LayerTo: LayerObj; IN X : AnyObj e c t );
BEGIN
TELL LayerTo TO ReceiveFromU (DArr [X.ObjID]) ;
END METHOD;
ASK METHOD SetSAPAnyObjID(IN X: AnyObject);
BEGIN
SELF.O b j I D :=DArr[X .ObjID].ObjID;
SELF.connectMode:=DArr[X.ObjID].connectMode;
END METHOD;
END OBJECT;
END MODULE.
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File: DPhysConnect.mod
Created:May 31st, 2000
Written by: Rasha Morsi
Purpose: Create a Physicel Connect definition File.

}

DEFINITION MODULE PhysConnect;
FROM DataObject IMPORT AnyObject,DArr;
FROM Layer
IMPORT LayerObj;
FROM Station
IMPORT StationObj;

VAR
PArr: ARRAY INTEGER,

INTEGER OF PhysConnectObj;

TYPE
PhysConnectObj = OBJ E C T ;
X
: AnyObject;
StationFrom , StationTo : StationObj;
SF, ST
: INTEGER;
ASK METHOD SetPhysConnectID(IN StationFrom, StationTo:StationObj)
TELL METHOD SendAcross (IN StationTo:StationObj ; IN X: AnyObject);
END OBJECT;
END MODULE.

File: IPhysConnect.mod
Created:May 31st, 2000
Written by: Rasha Morsi
Purpose: Create a Physicel Connect definition File.

IMPLEMENTATION MODULE PhysConnect;
OBJECT PhysConnectObj
ASK METHOD SetPhysConnectID(IN StationFrom, StationTo:StationObj)
BEGIN
SF:= StationFrom. StationID;
S T := StationTo.StationID;
END METHOD;
TELL METHOD SendAcross (IN StationTo:StationObj; IN X: AnyObject);
BEGIN
TELL StationTo.LArr[l] TO ReceiveFromD(DArr [X.ObjID]) ;
END METHOD;
END OBJECT;
END MODULE.
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{ *************
File: DTest.mod
Created: April 29th, 1999
Written by: Rasha, Damayanthi, Prahalad
Purpose: Create a Test definition File.
* * * * * *

* )

DEFINITION MODULE Test;
FROM
FROM
FROM
FROM

DataObject
Layer
Station
SAPMod

IMPORT
IMPORT
IMPORT
IMPORT

AnyObject,DArr;
LayerObj;
StationObj;
SAPObj;

TYPE
TestObj = OBJECT;
LayerlD, StationID, DestID : INTEGER;
L : LayerObj;
X: AnyObject;

TELL METHOD TestComm(IN X: AnyObject; IN L: LayerObj);
END OBJECT;
END MODULE.

File: ITest.mod
Created: April 29th, 1999
Written by: Rasha, Damayanthi, Prahalad
Purpose: Create a Test Implementation File.
* * * * * * * * * * * * *

J

IMPLEMENTATION MODULE Test;

OBJECT TestObj;
TELL METHOD TestComm(IN X: AnyObject; IN L: LayerObj);
BEGIN
TELL L TO ReceiveFromU(DArr[X.ObjID] );
END METHOD;
END OBJECT;
END MODULE.
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APPENDIX B
(PVS CODE)
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typedefs : THEORY
BEGIN

CC_state_type: TYPE = {Null, MM_Conpend, Call_Init, MO_Call_Proc,
Call_Delivered, Conn_Indic, Active}
MM_state_type: TYPE = {Idle, Wait_MOMM_Conn, Ciph_Mode_Init, Active,
Wai t_RR_Conn}
SAP_msg: TYPE = {MNCC_Setup_Req, MNCC_Call_Proc_Ind, MNCC_Alert_Ind,
MNCC_Setup_Cnf, MNCC_Setup_Ind, MNCC_Call_Proc_Req,
MNCC_Alert_Req, MNCC_Setup_Rsp,
MNCC_Setup_Compl_Ind,
MNCC_Sync_Ind,
MMCC_Est_Req, MMCC_Est_Cnf, MMCC_Data_Req_setup,
MMCC_Est_Ind_setup, MMCC_Call_Proc,
MMCC_Data_Ind_callproc, MMCC_Data_Req_callproc,
MMCC_Sync_Req, MMCC_Sync_Cnf, MMCC_Sync_Ind,
MMCC_Data_Ind_alert, MMCC_Data_Ind_connect,
MMCC_Data_Req_connack, MMCC_Data_Req_alert,
MMCC_Data_Req_connect, MMCC_Data_Ind_connack,
RR_Est_Req, RR_Est_Cnf, RR_Sync_Ind_ciph,
RR_Sync_Ind_res, RR_Est_Ind, RR_Sync_Req_ciph,
RR_Sync_Req_res, RR_Sync_Cnf_ciph, RR_Sync_Cnf_res,
RR_Data_Req_setup, RR_Data_Ind_callproc,
RR_Data_Ind_alert,
RR_Data_Ind_connect, RR_Data_Req_connack,
RR_Data_Req_alert,
RR_Data_Req_connect, RR_Data_Ind_connack,
RR_Data_Ind_setup,
RR_Data_Req_callproc, Data_msg, No_Msg}

END typedefs
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statedefs : THEORY
BEGIN
IMPORTING

typedefs

% For every sublayer, there is a record of sublayer states and message
% types available in that sublayer.
MNCC_SAP_type: TYPE =
[#

msg: SAP_msg

#1
MMCC_SAP_type: TYPE =
[#
msg: SAP_msg
#]

RR_SAP_type: TYPE =
[#
msg: SAP_msg

#1
CC_States: TYPE =
[#

Pres_s: CC_state_type,
SAP: MNCC_SAP_type

#]
MM_States: TYPE =

[#
Pres_s: MM_state_type,
SAP: MMCC_SAP_type

#]
% A Mobile Station and a Network can both have three sublayers : CC,
MM, RR
MS_state: TYPE =
[#

CC: CC_States,
MM: MM_States,
SAP: RR_SAP_type

#]
NET_State: TYPE =
[#

CC: CC_States,
MM: MM_States,
SAP: RR_SAP_type

#1
% A state can be a record of MS sublayers and states and NET sublayers
% and states.
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state_type: TYPE =
t i

x: bool,
MS: MS_state,
NET: NET_state,
n: { i:nat|i<40 & i>=0},
msg_in_MS: SAP_msg,
msg_in_NET: SAP_msg,
msg_out_MS: SAP_msg,
msg_out_NET: SAP_msg,
msg_in_MM_MS: SAP_msg,
msg_in_MM_NET: SAP_msg,
msg_out_MM_MS: SAP_msg,
msg_out_MM_NET: SAP_msg,
Pres_in_MM_MS: MM_state_type,
Pres_out_MM_MS: MM_state_type,
Pres_in_MS: CC_state_type,
Pres_out_MS: CC_s tate_type,
Pres_in_NET: CC_state_type,
Pres_out_NET: CC_state_type,
Pres_in_MM_NET: MM_state_type,
Pres_out_MM_NET: MM_state_type
#]

END statedefs
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gsmlayer3_7: THEORY
Begin
IMPORTING statedefs
s :VAR state_type
st:VAR state_type
y: VAR bool
Initial_state: TYPE = state_type
i : nat
% State transition specification for CC sublayer state machine for the
MS side
state_transition_CC_MS(s:state_type): state_type=
IF
Pres_in_MS (s )=Null AND msg_in_MS (s )= MNCC_Setup_Req THEN
s WITH [(MS)(CC)(Pres_s):= MM_Conpend, (MS)(MM)(SAP)(msg):=
MMCC_Es t_Req,
(msg_out_MM_MS):= MMCC_Es t_Req, (Pres_out_MS):= MM_Conpend]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MS(s )= MM_Conpend AND msg_in_MS(s )= MMCC_Est_Cnf
THEN
s WITH [(MS)(CC)(Pres_s):=Call_Init,
(Pres_out_MS):= Call_Init,
(MS)(MM)(SAP)(msg) := MMCC_Data_Req_setup,
(msg_out_MM_MS) := MMCC_Data_Req_setup]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MS (s) =Call_Init AND msg_in_MS (s )= MMCC_Data_Ind_callproc
THEN
s WITH [(MS)(CC)(Pres_s):= MO_Call_Proc,
(Pres_out_MS):= MO_Call_Proc,
(MS) (CC)(SAP) (msg) := MNCC_Call_Proc_Ind]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MS(s )=Call_Init AND msg_in_MS(s )= MMCC_Data_Ind_alert
THEN
s WITH [(MS)(CC)(Pres_s):= Call_Delivered,
(Pres_out_MS):= Call_Delivered,
(MS) (CC) (SAP) (msg) := MNCC_Alert_Ind]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MS (s) =Call_Init AND msg_in_MS (s )= MMCC_Data_Ind_connect
THEN
s WITH [(MS)(CC)(Pres_s):= Active,
(Pres_out_MS):= Active,
(MS)(CC)(SAP)(msg) := MNCC_Setup_Cnf,
(MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Data_Req_connacJc,
(msg_out_MM_MS):= MMCC_Data_Req_connack]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MS(s )= MO_Call_Proc AND msg_in_MS(s )= MMCC_Sync_Ind
THEN
s WITH [(MS)(CC)(Pres_s):= MO_Call_Proc,
(Pres_out_MS):= MO_Call_Proc,
(MS)(CC)(SAP)(msg):= MNCC_Sync_Ind,
(msg_out_MS) := MNCC_Sync_Ind]
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ELSIF
Pres_in_MS (s) =MO_Call_Proc AND msg_in_MS(s )= MMCC_Data_Ind_connect
THEN
s WITH [(MS)(CC)(Pres_s):= Active,
(Pres_out_MS):= Active,
(MS) (CC) (SAP) (msg) := MNCC_Setup_Cnf,
(MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Data_Req_connack,
(msg_out_MM_MS) := MMCC_Data_Req_connack ]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MS (s )= MO_Call_Proc AND msg_in_MS (s )= MMCC_Data_Ind_alert
THEN
s WITH [(MS)(CC)(Pres_s):= Call_Delivered,
(Pres_out_MS):= Call_Delivered,
(MS) (CC) (SAP) (msg) := MNCC_Alert_Ind]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MS(s )= Call_Delivered AND
msg_in_MS(s )= MMCC_Data_Ind_connect
THEN
s WITH ((MS)(CC)(Pres_s):= Active,
(Pres_out_MS):= Active,
(MS) (CC) (SAP) (msg) := MNCC_Setup_Cnf,
(MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Data_Req_connack,
(msg_out_MM_MS) := MMCC_Data_Req_connack ]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MS (s )= Active AND msg_in_MS (s )= Data_msg THEN
s WITH [(MS)(CC)(SAP)(msg):=Data_msg, (msg_out_MS):= Data_msg]
ELSE s
END IF
% State transition specification for CC sublayer state machine for the
NET side
% Imp
state_transition_CC_NET(s:state_type): state_type=
IF
Pres_in_NET(s)=Null AND msg_in_NET(s )= MMCC_Est_Ind_setup THEN
s WITH [(NET)(CC)(Pres_s):= Call_Init,
(Pres_out_NET):= Call_Init,
(NET) (CC) (SAP) (msg) := MNCC_Setup_Ind,
(msg_out_NET):= MNCC_Setup_Ind]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET (s )= Call_Init AND msg_in_NET (s )= MNCC_Setup_Ind
THEN
s WITH [(NET)(CC)(Pres_s):=Call_Init,
(Pres_out_NET):= Call_Init,
(NET) (CC) (SAP) (msg) := MNCC_Call_Proc_Req]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET(s)=Call_Init AND msg_in_NET(s )= MNCC_Call_Proc_Req
THEN
s WITH [(NET)(CC)(Pres_s):= MO_Call_Proc,
(Pres_out_NET):= MO_Call_Proc,
(NET) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Data_Req_callproc,
(msg_out_MM_NET) := MMCC_Data_Req_ca 1 lproc ]
ELSIF
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Pres_in_NET(s )=MO_Call_Proc AND
msg_in_NET(s )= MNCC_Cal l_Proc_Req
THEN
s WITH [(NET)(CC)(Pres_s):= MO_Call_Proc,
(Pres_out_NET):= MO_Call_Proc,
(msg_out_NET):= No_Msg,
(NET)(MM)(SAP)(msg) := MMCC_Sync_Req,
(msg_out_MM_.NET) := MMCC_Sync_Req]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET (s )=MO_Call_Proc AND
msg_in_NET (s )= MMCC_Sync_Cnf
THEN
s WITH [(NET)(CC)(Pres_s):= MO_Call_Proc,
(Pres_out_NET):= M0_Call_Proc]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET (s )=M0_Call_Proc AND msg_in_NET (s )= MNCC_Alert_Req
AND msg(SAP(MM(NET(s) ) ) )= MMCC_Sync_Cnf
THEN
s WITH [(NET)(CC)(Pres_s):= Call_Delivered,
(Pres_out_NET):= Call_Delivered,
(NET)(MM)(SAP)(msg):= MMCC_Data_Req_alert,
(msg_out_MM_NET):= MMCC_Data_Req_alert]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET (s )=M0_Call_Proc AND msg_in_NET (s )= MNCC_Setup_Rsp
AND m s g (SAP(MM(NET(s ))))= MMCC_Sync_Cnf
THEN
s WITH [(NET)(CC)(Pres_s):= Conn_Indic,
(Pres_out_NET):= Conn_Indic,
(NET)(MM)(SAP)(msg):= MMCC_Data_Req_connect,
(msg_out_MM_NET):= MMCC_Da ta_Req_connec t ]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET (s )=Call_Delivered AND
msg_in_NET(s )= MNCC_Setup_Rsp
THEN
s WITH [(NET)(CC)(Pres_s):= Conn_Indic,
(Pres_out_NET):= Conn_Indic,
(NET)(MM)(SAP)(msg):= MMCC_Data_Req_connect,
(msg_out_MM_NET):= MMCC_Data_Req_connect]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET(s )= Conn_Indic AND msg_out_MM_NET(s)=
RR_Data_Ind_connack
AND msg_out_NET (s )= MMCC_Da ta_Req_c onnec t
THEN
s WITH [(msg_out_NET):= MMCC_Data_Ind_connack,
(msg_in_NET):= MMCC_Data_Ind_connack,
(Pres_out_NET):= Conn_Indic]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET(s )=Conn_Indic AND
msg_in_NET(s )=
MMCC_Data_Ind_connack
AND Pres_out_MM_NET(s )= Active
THEN
s WITH [(Pres_out_NET):= Active,
(msg_out_NET):= MNCC_Setup_Compl_Ind,
(NET)(CC)(Pres_s):= Active,
(NET)(CC)(SAP)(msg):= MNCC_Setup_Compl_Ind]
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ELSIF Pres_in_NET(s )= Active AND msg_in_NET(s )=
MNCC_Setup_Compl_Ind
THEN
s WITH [(msg_out_NET):= Data_msg]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET (s )= Active AND msg_in_NET (s )= Data_msg
THEN
s WITH [ (NET) (CC) (SAP) (msg) :=Data_msg, (msg_out_MM_NET) :=
Data_msg,
(msg_out_NET):= Data_msg, (Pres_out_NET):= Active]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET(s )= Active AND msg_in_NET(s )= Data_msg
THEN
s
ELSE S
ENDIF
% State transition specification for MM sublayer state machine for the
MS side
% Imp
state_transition_MM_MS(s :state_type): state_type=
IF
Pres_in_MM_MS (s )=Idle AND msg_in_MM_MS (s )= MMCC_Est_Req
THEN
s WITH [(MS) (MM) (Pres_s) := Wait_RR_Conn, (MS) (SAP) (msg) :=
RR_Est_Req,
(NET) (SAP) (msg) := RR_Est_Ind, (msg_out_MM_MS) := RR_Est_Req,
(msg_out_MM_NET):= RR_Est_Ind,
(Pres_out_MM_MS) :=Wait_RR_Conn]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_MS(s )= Wait_RR_Conn AND msg_in_MM_MS(s )= RR_Est_Req
THEN
s WITH [(MS) (SAP) (msg) := RR_Est_Cnf, (msg_out_MM_MS) :=
RR_Est_Cnf]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_MS(s)=Wait_RR_Conn AND msg_in_MM_MS(s )= RR_Est_Cnf
THEN
s WITH [(MS)(MM)(Pres_s):= Wait_MOMM_Conn,
(Pres_out_MM_MS):= Wait_MOMM_Conn
%
(MS)(SAP)(msg):= RR_Serv_Req]

]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_MS(s)= Wait_MOMM_Conn AND
ms g_ in_MM_MS(s )= RR_Sync_Ind_ciph
THEN
s WITH [(MS)(MM)(Pres_s):= Active,
(Pres_out_MM_MS):= Active,
(MS)(MM)(SAP)(msg):= MMCC_Est_Cnf,
(msg_out_MS):= MMCC_Est_Cnf,
(NET) (SAP) (msg) := RR_Sync_Cnf_ciph,
(msg_out_MM_NET):= RR_Sync_Cnf_ciph]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_MS (s )= Active AND msg_in_MM_MS (s )= RR_Data_Ind_alert
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THEN
s WITH [(MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Data_Ind_alert,
(msg_out_MS) := MMCC_Data_Ind_alert]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_MS (s )= Active AND msg_in_MM_MS (s )= RR_Data_Ind_callproc
THEN
s WITH [(MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Data_Ind_callproc,
(msg_out_MS) := MMCC__Data_Ind_callproc]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_MS(s )= Active AND msg_in_MM_MS(s )= RR_Data_Ind_connect
THEN
s WITH [ (MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Data_Ind_connect,
(msg_out_MS) := MMCC_Data_Ind_connect]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_MS (s )= Active AND msg_in_MM_MS (s )= MMCC_Data_Req_setup
THEN
s WITH [ (MS) (SAP) (msg) := RR_Data_Reg_setup,
(Pres_out_MM_MS):= Active,
(msg_out_MM_MS):= RR_Data_Req_setup,
(NET)(SAP)(msg):= RR_Data_Ind_setup,
(msg_out_MM_NET):= RR_Data_Ind_setup]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_MS(s )= Active AND msg_in_MM_MS{s )= MMCC_Data_Req_connack
THEN
s WITH [(MS) (SAP) (msg):= RR_Data_Req_connack,
(msg_out_MM_MS):= RR_Data_Req_connack,
(NET) (SAP) (msg) := RR_Data_Ind_connack,
(msg_out_MM_NET) := RR_Data_Ind_connack]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_MS(s )= Active AND msg_in_MM_MS(s )= RR_Sync_Ind_res
THEN
s WITH [ (msg_out_MM_NET) := RR_Sync_Cnf_res,
(Pres_out_MM_MS) :=Active,
(msg_out_MM_NET):= RR_Sync_Cnf_res,
(MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Sync._Ind,
(msg_out_MS):= MMCC_Sync_Ind,
(NET) (SAP) (msg) :=RR_Sync_Cnf_res]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_MS(s )= Active AND msg_in_MM_MS(s )= Data_msg
THEN
s WITH [(MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) :=Data_msg, (msg_out_MM_MS) := Data_msg,
(msg_out_MS):= Data_msg]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_MS (s )=Active AND msg_in_MM_MS (s )=Data_msg
THEN
s
ELSE s
END IF
% State transition specification for MM sublayer state machine for the
NET side
% Imp
state_transition_MM_NET(s:state_type) : state_type=
IF
Pres_in_MM_NET (s )=Idle AND msg_in_MM_NET (s )= RR_Est_Ind THEN
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S WITH [(NET) (MM) (Pres_s) := Wait_MOMM_Conn,
(Pres_out_MM_NET) := Wait_MOMM_Conn]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_NET (s )= Wait_MOMM_Conn AND msg_in_MM_NET (s )=RR_Est_Ind
THEN
s WITH [(NET)(MM)(Pres_s):= Ciph_Mode_Init,
(Pres_out_MM_NET):= Ciph_Mode_Init,
(NET) (SAP) (msg) := RR_Sync_Req_ciph,
(msg_out_MM_NET) := RR_Sync_Recj_ciph,
(msg_out_MM_MS) := RR_Sync_Ind_ciph]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_NET (s )= Ciph_Mode_Init AND msg_in_MM_NET (s)=
RR_Sync_Cnf_ciph
THEN
s WITH [(NET) (MM) (Pres_s) := Wait_MOMM_Conn,
(Pres_out_MM_NET) := Wait_MOMM_Conn]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_NET (s )=Wai t_MOMM_Conn AND msg_in_MM_NET (s )=
RR_Data_Ind_setup
THEN
s WITH [ (NET) (MM) (Pres_s) := Idle,
(Pres_out_MM_NET):= Idle]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_NET (s )=Idle AND msg_in_MM_NET (s )= RR_Data_Ind_setup
THEN
s WITH [(NET)(MM)(Pres_s):= Active,
(Pres_out_MM_NET):= Active,
(NET)(MM)(SAP)(msg):= MMCC_Est_Ind_setup,
(msg_out_NET) := MMCC_Est_Ind_setup]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_NET (s )= Active AND msg_in_MM_NET (s )=
MMCC_Data_Req_callproc
THEN
s WITH [ (Pres_out_MM_NET) := Active,
(NET)(SAP)(msg):= RR_Data_Req_callproc,
(msg_out_MM_NET) := RR_Data_Req_callproc,
(MS)(SAP)(msg):= RR_Data_Ind_callproc,
(msg_out_MM_MS) := RR_Data_Ind_callproc]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_NET (s )= Active AND msg_in_MM_NET (s )=
MMCC_Data_Req_connect
THEN
s WITH [(Pres_out_MM_NET):= Active,
(NET)(SAP)(msg):= RR_Data_Req_connect,
(msg_out_MM_NET) := RR_Data_Req_connect,
(MS) (SAP) (msg) := RR_Data_Ind_connect,
(msg_out_MM_MS) := RR_Data_Ind_connect]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_NET (s )=Active AND msg_in_MM_NET (s )=
MMCC_Data_Req_alert
THEN
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s WITH [ (Pres_out_MM_NET) := Active,
(NET) (SAP) (msg) := RR_Data_Req_alert,
(msg_out_MM_NET) := RR_Data_Req_alert,
(MS)(SAP)(msg):= RR_Data_Ind_alert,
(msg_out_MM_MS) := RR_Data_Ind_alert]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_NET (s)= Active AND msg_in_MM_NET (s )=
MMCC_Data_Ind_connack
THEN
s WITH [ (msg_out_NET) := MMCC_Data_Ind_connack,
(msg_in_NET) := MMCC_Data_Ind_connack,
(Pres_out_MM_NET):= Active,
(NET) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Data_Ind_connack]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_NET (s )= Active AND msg_in_MM_NET (s )= MMCC_Sync_Req
THEN
s WITH [ (NET) (MM) (Pres_s) := Wait_RR_Conn,
(Pres_out_MM_NET) := Wai t_RR_C o n n ,
(NET) (SAP) (msg) := RR_Sync_Req_res,
(msg_out_MM_NET) := RR_Sync_Req_res,
(msg_out_MM_MS) :=RR_Sync_Ind_res]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_NET (s )= Wai t_RR_Conn AND
msg_in_MM_NET(s )= RR_Sync_Cnf_res
THEN
s WITH [(msg_out_NET):= MMCC_Sync_Cnf,
(NET)(MM) (Pres_s):= Active,
(Pres_out_MM_NET) := Active,
(NET) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Sync_Cnf]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_NET (s )= Active AND msg_in_MM_NET (s)= Data_msg
THEN
s WITH [ (NET) (MM) (SAP) (msg) :=Data_msg, (NET) (SAP) (msg) :=Data_msg,
(MS) (SAP) (msg) := Data_msg, (msg_out_MM_NET) := Data_msg,
(msg_out_MM_MS) := Data_msg]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_NET (s)=Active AND msg_in_MM_NET (s)=Data_msg
THEN
s
ELSE S
ENDIF

% State transition specification for CC sublayer state machine for the
MS side
% SPEC
state_transition_CC_MS_Spec(s:state_type): state_type=
IF
Pres_in_MS (s )=Null AND msg_in_MS (s )= MNCC_Setup_Req THEN
s WITH [ (MS) (CC) (Pres_s) := MM_Conpend, (MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) :=
MMCC_Es t_Req,
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(msg_out_MS):= MMCC_Est_Req, (Pres_out_MS):= MM_Conpend]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MS (s )= MM_Conpend AND msg_in_MS (s )= MMCC_Est_Req
THEN
s WITH [ (MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Est_Cnf,
(msg_out_MS) := MMCC_Est_Cnf ]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MS (s )= MM_Conpend AND msg_in_MS (s )= MMCC_Est_Cnf
THEN
s WITH [(MS)(CC) (Pres_s):=Call_Init,
(Pres_out_MS ):= Call_Init,
(MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Data_Req_setup,
(msg_out_MS):= MMCC_Data_Req_setup,
(msg_out_NET) := MMCC_Est_Ind_setup]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MS(s) =Call_Init AND msg_in_MS(s )= MMCC_Data_Ind_callproc
THEN
s WITH [ (MS)(CC)(Pres_s):= MO_Call_Proc,
(Pres_out_MS):= MO_Call_Proc,
(MS) (CC) (SAP) (msg) := MNCC_Call_Proc_Ind]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MS (s )=Call_Init AND msg_in_MS (s )= MMCC_Data_Ind_alert
THEN
s WITH [ (MS) (CC) (Pres_s) := Call_Delivered,
(Pres_out_MS) := Call_Delivered,
(MS) (CC) (SAP) (msg) := MNCC_Alert_Ind]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MS(s) =Call_Init AND msg_in_MS(s )= MMCC_Data_Ind_connect
THEN
s WITH [ (MS) (CC) (Pres_s) := Active,
(Pres_out_MS) := Active,
(MS) (CC) (SAP) (msg) := MNCC_Setup_Cnf,
(MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Data_Req_connack,
(msg_out_MS) := MMCC_Data_Req_connack,
(msg_out_NET) := MMCC_Data_Ind_connack]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MS (s )= MO_Call_Proc AND msg_in_MS (s )= MMCC_Sync_Ind
THEN
s WITH [(MS) (CC)(Pres_s) := MO_Call_Proc,
(Pres_out_MS):= MO_Call_Proc,
(MS) (CC) (SAP) (msg) := MNCC_Sync_Ind]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MS (s )=MO_Call_Proc AND msg_in_MS (s )= MMCC_Data_Ind_connect
THEN
s WITH [(MS) (CC) (Pres_s) := Active,
(Pres_out_MS) := Active,
(MS) (CC) (SAP) (msg) := MNCC_Setup_Cnf,
(MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Data_Req_connack,
(msg_out_MS) := MMCC_Data_Req_connack,
(msg_out_NET) := MMCC_Data_Ind_connack]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MS (s )= MO_Call_Proc AND msg_in_MS (s )= MMCC_Data_Ind_alert
THEN
s WITH [(MS) (CC) (Pres_s) := Call_Delivered,
(Pres_out_MS) := Call_Delivered,
(MS) (CC) (SAP) (msg) := MNCC_Alert_Ind]
ELSIF
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Pres_in_MS(s )= Call_Delivered AND
msg_in_MS (s )= MMCC_Dat a_ Ind_c onnec t
THEN
s WITH [(MS)(CC)(Pres_s):= Active,
(Pres_out_MS):= Active,
(MS)(CC)(SAP)(msg):= MNCC_Setup_Cnf,
(MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Data_Req_connack,
(msg_out_MS) := MMCC_Data_Req_connack,
(msg_out_NET) := MMCC_Data_Ind_connack]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MS (s )= Active AND msg_in_MS (s )= Data_msg THEN
s WITH [(MS)(CC)(SAP)(msg):=Data_msg, (msg_out_MS):= Data_msg]
ELSE s
END IF
state_transition_CC_NET_Spec (s :state_type) : state_type=
IF
Pres_in_NET(s)=Null AND msg_in_NET(s )= MMCC_Est_Ind_setup THEN
s WITH [(NET)(CC)(Pres_s):= Call_Init, (NET)(CC)(SAP)(msg):=
MNCC_Setup_Ind,
(msg_out_NET):= MNCC_Setup_Ind, (Pres_out_NET):=
Call_Init]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET(s )= Call_Init AND msg_in_NET(s )= MNCC_Setup_Ind
THEN
s WITH [(NET)(CC)(Pres_s):=Call_Init,
(Pres_out_NET):= Call_Init,
(NET) (CC) (SAP) (msg) := MNCC_Call_Proc_Req]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET(s) =Call_Init AND msg_in_NET(s )= MNCC_Call_Proc_Req
THEN
s WITH [(NET)(CC)(Pres_s):= MO_Call_Proc,
(Pres_out_NET):= MO_Call_Proc,
(NET) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Data_Req_callproc,
(msg_out_NET) := MMCC_Data_Req_callproc]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET(s )= MO_Call_Proc AND
msg_in_NET(s )= MMCC_Data_Req_callproc
THEN
s WITH [(MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Data_Ind_callproc,
(msg_out_MS) := MMCC_Data_Ind_callproc,
(NET) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Sync_Req,
(msg_out_NET) := MMCC_Sync_Req]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET(s )= MO_Call_Proc AND msg_in_NET(s )= MMCC_Sync_Req
THEN
s WITH [ (MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Sync_Ind,
(msg_out_MS) := MMCC_Sync_Ind,
(msg_out_NET) := MMCC_Sync_Cnf,
(NET)(MM)(SAP)(msg):= MMCC_Sync_Cnf ]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET (s )=MO_Call_Proc AND msg (SAP (MM (NET (s) ) ) )= MMCC_Sync_Cnf
AND msg_in_NET(s )= MNCC_Alert_Req
THEN
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s WITH [(NET)(CC)(Pres_s):= Call_Delivered,
(Pres_out_NET) := Call_Delivered,
(NET)(MM)(SAP)(msg):= MMCC_Data_Req_alert]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET(s )=MO_Call_Proc AND
msg_in_NET(s )= MMCC_Sync_Cnf
THEN
s WITH [(NET)(CC)(Pres_s):= MO_Call_Proc, (Pres_out_NET):=
MO_Call_Proc]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET(s )= Call_Delivered AND
msg_in_NET(s )= MMCC_Data_Req_alert
THEN
s WITH [(MS)(MM) (SAP)(msg):= MMCC_Data_Ind_alert,
(msg_out_MS) := MMCC_Data_Ind_aler t ]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET(s )=MO_Call_Proc
AND msg_in_NET(s )= MNCC_Setup_Rsp
THEN
s WITH [(NET)(CC)(Pres_s):= Conn_Indic,
(Pres_out_NET) := Conn_Indic,
(NET)(MM)(SAP)(msg):= MMCC_Data_Req_connect]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET(s )= Conn_Indic AND
msg_in_NET (s )=MMCC_Da t a_Req_connec t
THEN
s WITH [(MS)(MM)(SAP)(msg):= MMCC_Data_Ind_connect,
(msg_out_MS) := MMCC_Data_Ind_connect]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET(s )=Call_Delivered AND
msg_in_NET(s )= MNCC_Setup_Rsp
THEN
s WITH [(NET)(CC)(Pres_s):= Conn_Indic,
(Pres_out_NET) := Conn_Indic,
(NET)(MM)(SAP) (msg):= MMCC_Data_Req_connect]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET(s )=Conn_Indic AND msg_in_NET(s )= MMCC_Data_Ind_connack
THEN
s WITH [(NET)(CC)(Pres_s):= Active,
(Pres_out_NET) := Active,
(NET)(CC)(SAP)(msg):= MNCC_Setup_Compl_Ind,
(msg_out_NET):= Data_msg]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET(s )= Active AND msg_in_NET(s )= Data_msg THEN
s WITH [(NET)(CC)(SAP) (msg):=Data_msg, (NET)(MM)(SAP)(msg):=
Data_msg,
(MS)(MM)(SAP)(msg):= Data_msg, (NET)(SAP)(msg):=
Data_msg,
(MS)(SAP)(msg):= Data_msg, (msg_out_NET):= Data_msg,
(msg_out_MS):= Data_msg, (msg_in_MM_NET):= Data_msg,
(msg_out_MM_NET):= Data_msg, (msg_in_MM_MS):= Data_msg,
(msg_out_MM_MS):= Data_msg, (Pres_in_MM_MS):= Active,
(Pres_in_MM_NET) := Active, (Pres_out_MM_MS) := Active,
(Pres_out_MM_NET) := Active, (NET) (MM) (Pres_s) :=Active,
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(MS) (MM) (Pres_s) :=Active, (Pres_in_MS) :=Active,
(Pres_in_NET):= Active, (Pres_out_MS):= Active,
(Pres_out_NET):= Active ]
ELSE s
ENDIF
Input_Control(s :state_type, x :bool): state_type=
IF
Pres_in_MS (s )= Null AND Pres_in_NET(s )=Null AND Pres_in_MM_MS (s) =
Idle
AND Pres_in_MM_NET(s )=Idle
THEN
s WITH [(msg_out_MS):= MNCC_Setup_Req]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET(s )= Call_Init AND msg_in_NET(s )= MNCC_Setup_Ind
THEN
s WITH [ (msg_out_NET) := MNCC_Call_Proc_Req]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET (s )= MO_Call_Proc AND msg_out_NET(s )= MMCC_Sync_Cnf
THEN
( IF x = FALSE
THEN
s WITH [ (msg_out_NET) := MNCC_Alert_Req ]
ELSE
S WITH [(msg_out_NET) := MNCC_Setup_Rsp ]
ENDIF)
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET (s )=Call_Delivered AND
msg (SAP (MM (NET (s)) )) =MMCC_Data_Req_alert
THEN
s WITH [(msg_out_NET):= MNCC_Setup_Rsp]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET (s )= Conn_Indic AND msg_in_NET (s )= MNCC_Setup_Rsp
THEN
s WITH
[(msg_out_NET):= msg(SAP(MM(NET(s))))]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET(s )= Conn_Indic AND msg_in_NET(s )= MNCC_Alert_Req
THEN
s WITH [ (msg_out_NET) := msg(SAP(MM(NET(s))))]
ELSE
s
ENDIF
s: TYPE = state_type
s t : TYPE= state_type
Initial_state(s:state_type): s = (s WITH [(NET)(CC)(Pres_s):=Null,
(MS)(CC)(Pres_s) :=Null,
(NET) (MM) (Pres_s) :=Idle, (MS) (MM) (Pres_s) :=Idle,
(NET) (CC) (SAP) (msg) := No_Msg,
(MS)(CC)(SAP)(msg):= No_Msg, %MNCC_Setup_Req,
(MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := No_Msg,
(NET) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := No_Msg,
(NET) (SAP) (msg) := No_Msg,
(MS) (SAP)(msg):= No_Msg,
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(msg_in_MS):= No_Msg,
(msg_out_MS) := No_Msg, %MNCC_Setup_Req,
(msg_in_NET):= No_Msg,
(msg_out_NET):= No_Msg,
(msg_in_MM_MS):= No_Msg,
(msg_out_MM_MS):= No_Msg,
(msg_in_MM_NET) := No_Msg,
(msg_out_MM_NET) := NoJMsg,
(Pres_in_MS):=Null, (Pres_in_NET):= Null,
(Pres_out_MS):= Null, (Pres_out_NET):= Null,
(Pres_in_MM_MS): = Idle, (Pres_out_MM_MS):= Idle
(Pres_in_MM_NET) := Idle, (Pres_out_MM_NET): =
Idle,
(n):=30])
Final_state(st:state_type) : st = (st WITH [ (NET) (CC) (Pres_s) :=Active,
(MS)(CC)(Pres_s):=Active,
(NET) (MM) (Pres_s) :=Idle, (MS) (MM) (Pres_s) :=Idle
(NET)(CC)(SAP)(msg):= Data_msg,
(MS)(CC)(SAP)(msg):= Data_msg,
(MS)(MM)(SAP)(msg) := Data_msg,
(NET)(MM)(SAP)(msg) := Data_msg,
(NET)(SAP)(msg) := Data_msg,
(MS)(SAP)(msg):= Data_msg,
(msg_in_MS):= Data_msg,
(msg_out_MS):= Data_msg,
(msg_in_NET):= Data_msg,
(msg_out_NET):= Data_msg,
(msg_in_MM_MS):= Data_msg,
(msg_out_MM_MS):= Data_msg,
(msg_in_MM_NET):= Data_msg,
(msg_out_MM_NET):= Data_msg,
(n):=01)
Final_statel(st:state_type): st = (st WITH [(NET)(CC)(Pres_s):=Active,
(MS) (CC)(Pres_s):=Active,
(NET)(MM)(Pres_s):=Active,
(MS)(MM)(Pres_s) :=Active,
(NET)(CC)(SAP)(msg):= Data_msg,
(MS)(CC)(SAP)(msg):= Data_msg,
(MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := Data_msg,
(NET)(MM)(SAP)(msg) :=Data_msg,
(NET)(SAP)(msg):= Data_msg,
(MS)(SAP)(msg):= Data_msg,
(msg_in_MS):= Data_msg,
(msg_out_MS):= Data_msg,
(msg_in_NET):= Data_msg,
(msg_out_NET):= Data_msg,
(msg_in_MM_MS):= Data_msg,
(msg_out_MM_MS):= Data_msg,
(msg_in_MM_NET):= Datajmsg,
(msg_out_MM_NET):= Data_msg,
(Pres_in_MS):=Active, (Pres_in_NET):= Active,
(Pres_out_MS):= Active, (Pres_out_NET):= Active,
(Pres_in_MM_MS):= Active, (Pres_out_MM_MS):=
Active,
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(Pres_in_MM_NET):= Active,

(Pres_out_MM_NET):=

Active,
(n):=0])

% test is a test value to make the transitions go through both cases of
% input messages
test: bool
% This is a function to perform a single state transition through all
the
% state machines for the implementation with the present values of s
single_step(s:state_type): state_type=
(state_transition_CC_NET_Spec (
state_transition_CC_MS_Spec (Input_Control (
s WITH [(msg_in_MS):= msg_out_MS (s ) , (msg_in_NET) := msg_out_NET(s ),
(Pres_in_MS) := Pres_out_MS (s ) , (Pres_in_NET) :=
Pres_out_NET(s )
],test))))
% This is a function to perform a single state transition through all
the
% state machines for the implementation with the present values of s
single_stepl(s :state_type):
state_type=
(state_transition_CC_NET(
state_transition_MM_NET(
state_transition_MM_MS(
state_transition_CC_MS(Input_Control(s WITH [ (msg_in_MS):=
msg_out_MS(s ) ,
(msg_in_NET):= msg_out_NET(s ),
(msg_in_MM_MS) := msg_out_MM_MS (s ) ,
(msg_in_MM_NET) := msg_out_MM_NET (s ) ,
(Pres_in_MS):= Pres_out_MS(s ),
(Pres_in_MM_MS) := Pres_out_MM_MS (s ) ,
(Pres_in_NET):= Pres_out_NET(s ),
(Pres_in_MM_NET) := Pres_out_MM_NET (s )]
.test ))))))
state(s:state_type) : RECURSIVE state_type=
IF n(s)=0 THEN single_step(s)
ELSE
state(single_step(s WITH [(n):= n(s)-l]))
ENDIF
MEASURE n(s)

statel(s:state_type) : RECURSIVE state_type=
IF n(s)=0 THEN single_stepl(s)
ELSE
statel(single_stepl(s WITH [ (n) :=n(s)-1]))
ENDIF
MEASURE n(s)
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% LEMMAS to help prove the TCC generated
st_tran_CC_MS: LEMMA
FORALL (n:nat):
NOT n(s)= 0 IMPLIES n(state_transition_CC_MS(Input_Control(
s WITH [ (n):=n(s)-l],test)))< n(s)
state_TCC_intl: LEMMA
FORALL (n:nat):
NOT n(s)=0 IMPLIES
n (state_transition_MM_MS (state_transition_CC_MS (Input_Control (s WITH
[(n):=n(s)-1],test))))<n(s)
state_TCC_int2: LEMMA
FORALL(n:nat):
NOT n(s)=0 IMPLIES
n (state_transition_MM_NET (state_transition_MM_MS (state_transition_CC_MS
(Input_Control(s WITH [ (n) :=n(s)-1] , test)))))<n(s)
state_TCC_int3: LEMMA
FORALL (n:nat):
NOT n(s)=0 IMPLIES
n (state_transition_CC_NET (state_transition_MM_NET (state_transition_MM_M
S (state_transition_CC_MS(
Input_Control(s W I T H [(n):= n(s)-1],test))))))<n(s)

statel_TCCl: LEMMA
FORALL(s:state_type):
NOT n(s) =0 IMPLIES n(single_stepl(s WITH [(n):= n(s)-l])) < n(s)
% LEMMAS to prove the state TCC
s t_t ran_CC_MS_spec: LEMMA
FORALL (n:nat):
NOT n(s)= 0 IMPLIES n(state_transition_CC_MS_Spec(Input_Control(
s WITH [ (n):=n(s)-l].test)))< n(s)
s tate_TCC_intl_Spec: LEMMA
FORALL (n:nat):
NOT n(s)=0 IMPLIES
n(state_transition_CC_NET_Spec (state_transition_CC_MS_Spec (
Input_Control(s WITH [(n) :=n(s)-1], test) ) ) ><n(s)
State_TCC3: LEMMA
FORALL (s:state_type):
NOT n(s) =0 IMPLIES n(single_step(s WITH [(n):= n(s)-l]))< n(s)

Communication_spec(s:state_type) : state_type=state(s)
Communication_imp(s:state_type) :
state_type= statel(s)
Comm_2_correct: LEMMA
Coiranunication_imp (Initial_state (s )) = Final_statel (s )
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Comm_correct: LEMMA
Communication_spec(Initial_state(s ))=Final_statel(s)
Communication_correct: LEMMA
Comntunication_inqp(Initial_state(s))=
Conmunication_spec(Initial_state(s ))
END gsmlayer3_7
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APPENDIX C
(PROOFS)
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TCC Proofs:
(|gsmlayer3_7 | (|Initial_state_TCCl | "* (ASSERT) NIL NIL)
(|Final_state_TCCl| "" (ASSERT) NIL NIL)
(jstate_TCCl| ” (ASSERT)
(("" (SKOLEM!) (("’ (ASSERT) ((” (SMASH) NIL NIL) ) NIL)) NIL)) NIL)
(Istate_TCC2| "• (SKOLEM!)
(("" (REWRITE "single_step")
(("1" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_MS_Spec")
((" 1" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_NET_Spec")
( C l ’ (SMASH) NIL NIL) ("2" (POSTPONE) NIL NIL)
("3" (POSTPONE)
NIL NIL)
("4"
(POSTPONE) NIL NIL) ("5" (POSTPONE) NIL NIL)
("6"
(POSTPONE) NIL NIL) ("7" (POSTPONE) NIL NIL)
("8"
(POSTPONE) NIL NIL) C 9 " (POSTPONE) NIL NIL)
("10" (POSTPONE) NIL NIL) ("11" (POSTPONE) NIL NIL)
("12" (POSTPONE) NIL NIL) ("13" (POSTPONE) NIL NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL)
("2" (POSTPONE) NIL NIL))
NIL))
NIL)
(|st_tran_CC_MS| "" (SKOLEM!)
(("" (REWRITE "Input_Control")
(("1" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_MS")
(("1" (SMASH) NIL NIL)
("2" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_MS") ("2" (SMASH) NIL NIL))NIL)
("3" (SMASH) NIL NIL))NIL)
("3" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_MS")
("4" (SMASH) NIL NIL))NIL)
("4" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_MS")
("5" (SMASH) NIL NIL))NIL)
("5" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_MS")
("6" (SMASH) NIL NIL))NIL)
("6" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_MS")
("7" (SMASH) NIL NIL))NIL)
("7" (REWRITE "state_trans it ion_CC_MS")
("8" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_MS") ("8" (SMASH) NIL NIL))NIL)
("9" (SMASH) NIL NIL))NIL)
("2" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_MS") (("2" (SMASH) NIL NIL)) NIL))
NIL))NIL)

ZaSMMAS to Provo tho TCCS that tho typchochor could not
provo:
(|state_TCC_intl| "" (SKOLEM!)
((" ’ (USE "st_tran_CC_MS")
(("" (REWRITE "state_transition_MM_MS•)
(("1" (SMASH) NIL NIL)
("2" (REWRITE "state_transition_MM_MS") (("2" (SMASH) NIL NIL))
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL))
NIL)
(Istate_TCC_int2| "" (SKOLEM!)
(("" (USE "state_TCC_intl")
(("" (REWRITE "state_transition_MM_NET")
(("1" (SMASH) NIL NIL)
("2" (REWRITE "state_transition_MM_NET") (("2" (SMASH) NIL NIL))
NIL))
NIL))
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NIL) )
NIL)
(jstate_TCC_int3| "" (SKOLEM!)
((* • (USE *state_TCC_int2")
(("" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_NET")
(("1" (SMASH) NIL NIL)
("2* (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_NET") (("2* (SMASH) NIL NIL))
NIL))
NIL))
NIL))
NIL)
(|statelJTCCl| "" (SKOLEM!)
((- - (USE "state_TCC_int3")
((*" (REWRITE "single_stepl’)
(("1" (SMASH)
(C l " (USE "state_TCC_int2 ’)
(Cl" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_NET")
(("1" (SMASH)
(("1" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_NET")
(Cl* (SMASH)
(("1" (USE "state_TCC_intl")
(("1" (REWRITE "state_transition_MM_NET")
(("1" (SMASH)
(("1" (REWRITE "state_transition_MM_NET")
(("1" (SMASH)
(("1" (USE "st_tran_CC_MS")
(("1" (REWRITE "state_transition_MM_MS")
( C l " (SMASH)
(("1" (REWRITE "state_transition_MM_MS")
(("1" (SMASH)
( C l " (REWRITE "Input_Control" +)
(Cl*
(REWRITE "state_transition_CC_MS" + )
(("1" (SMASH) NIL NIL))
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL))
NIL))
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL))
NIL))
NIL)
("2" (REWRITE "single_stepl") (("2" (SMASH) NIL NIL)) NIL))
NIL) )
NIL) )
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NIL)

(|st_tran_CC_MS_spec| *" (SKOLEM!)
(<’" (REWRITE "Input_Control")
(("1" (REWRITE -state_transition_CC_MS_Spec“)
(Cl(SMASH) NIL NIL) ("2- (SMASH) NIL NIL) ("3" (SMASH) NIL NIL)
("4"
(SMASH) NIL
NIL)
("5"
(SMASH)
NIL NIL)("6"
(SMASH)NIL
("7"
(SMASH) NIL
NIL)
C8'
(SMASH)
NIL NIL)C 9 "
(SMASH)NIL
NIL)
("2" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_MS_Spec") (("2" (SMASH) NIL
NIL)) NIL))
NIL) )
NIL)
(Istate_TCC_intl_Spec| "" (SKOLEM!)
(("" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_NET_Spec")
((’1- (SMASH)
( C l - (REWRITE "Input_Control")
(("1" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_MS_Spec") ( C l ’ (SMASH) NIL
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL)
("2" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_NET_Spec") (("2" (SMASH) NIL
NIL)) NIL))
NIL) )
NIL)
(Istate_TCC3| "’ (SKOLEM!)
(C ’ (USE "state_TCC_intl_Spec')
((” (REWRITE "single_step")
( C l - (SMASH)
((" 1" (USE "s t_tran_CC_MS_spec")
(("1" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_NET_Spec" + )
((-1- (SMASH)
((”1 ’ (REWRITE ■Input_Control" +)
(("1" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_MS_Spec" +)
( C l - (SMASH) NIL NIL) ) NIL))
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL))
NIL) )
NIL)
("2" (REWRITE "single_step") ( C 2 " (SMASH) NIL NIL) ) NIL))
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL)

LKMMA to prova communication raachaa a final atata
(inplaxnantation)
(|Comm_2_correct| "’ (SKOLEM!)
((-- (REWRITE "Initial_state*)
(("" (REWRITE "Communication_iinp")
(("’ (REWRITE 'statel-)
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((” (REWRITE "single_stepl")
(("" (REWRITE "Input_Control ")
((’" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_MS")
(("" (REWRITE "state_transition_MM_MS")
(("" (REWRITE "state_transition_MM_NET")
((*" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_NET")
(("■ (REWRITE "statel")
((’* (REWRITE "single_stepl*)
( (*" (REWRITE "Input_Control")
(("" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_MS")
(('" (REWRITE "state_transition_MM_MS")
(("" (REWRITE *state_transition_MM_NET")
((*" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_NET")
( (* ’ (AUTO-REWRITE "statel")
((” (REWRITE "statel")
(("" (AUTO-REWRITE "single_stepl")
((""

(REWRITE "single_stepl")
((""

(AUTO-REWRITE "Input_Control")
((""

(REWRITE "Input_Control")
( (""

(AUTO-REWRITE
"state_transition_CC_MS")
( (""

(REWRITE
"state_transition_CC_MS")
((""

(AUTO-REWRITE
"state_transition_MM_MS")

((..

(REWRITE
"state_transition_MM_MS")
((""

(AUTO-REWRITE
"state_transition_MM_NET")
((""

(REWRITE
"state_transition_MM_NET")
((""

(AUTO-REWRITE
"state_transition_CC_NET")
((""

(REWRITE
"state_transition_CC_NET")
( C"
(REWRITE
"statel")
((""

(REWRITE
"Final_statel")
( C"
(SMASH)
NIL
NIL) )
NIL) )
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NIL))
NIL) )
NIL) )
NI L ) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL))
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL))
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL)

LEMMA to prova coxmmmicat ion raachas a final atata
(spacification)
(|Comm_correct| ’" (SKOLEM!)
(("" (REWRITE "Initial_state")
(("" (REWRITE "Communication_spec")
(("" (REWRITE "state")
(("" (REWRITE "single_step")
(("" (REWRITE "Input_Control")
(("" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_MS_Spec")
(("" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_NET_Spec")
(("" (REWRITE "state")
(("" (REWRITE "single_step")
(("" (REWRITE "Input_Control")
(("" (REWRITE "state_transi tion_CC_MS_Spec")
(("" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_NET_Spec")
(("" (AUTO-REWRITE "state")
(("" (REWRITE "state")
(("" (AUTO-REWRITE "single_step")
(("" (REWRITE "single_step")
(("" (AUTO-REWRITE "Input_Control")
(("" (REWRITE "Input_Control")
((""
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(AUTO-REWRITE
"state_transition_CC_MS_Spec")
((""

(REWRITE
"state_transition_CC_MS_Spec")

((..

(AUTO-REWRITE
"state_transition_CC_NET_Spec")

( (..

(REWRITE
"state_transition_CC_NET_Spec
*)

( (..

(REWRITE "State")
( C"
(SMASH)
( C"
(REWRITE "Final_statel")
NIL
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL))
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL))
NIL) )
NIL))
NIL)

XiSMMA. to prove coomunicat ion
(iaplaaontation ■ Specification)
(|Coiranunication_correct| "" (SKOLEM!)
(("" (REWRITE "Initial_state")
(("" (REWRITE "Communication_imp")
((’" (REWRITE "statel")
(("" (REWRITE "single_stepl")
(("" (REWRITE *Input_Control")
(("" (REWRITE ’state_transition_CC_MS")
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(("’ (REWRITE "state_transition_MM_MS’)
(("" (REWRITE "state_transition_MM_NET")
(("" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_NET")
(("" (REWRITE ’statel*)
((” (REWRITE "single_stepl")
((” (REWRITE "Input_Control’)
(( ” (REWRITE ’s tate_trans i ti on_CC_MS")
((” (REWRITE ’state_transition_MM_MS")
((” (REWRITE "state_transition_MM_NET*)
((” (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_NET*)
((” (AUTO-REWRITE "statel’)
((” (REWRITE "statel")
(("" (AUTO-REWRITE "single_stepl")
((""

(REWRITE "single_stepl")
( C"
(AUTO-REWRITE "Input_Control")
((""

(REWRITE "Input_Control")
((""

(AUTO-REWRITE
"state_transition_CC_MS")
((""

(REWRITE
"state_transition_CC_MS")
((""

(AUTO-REWRITE
"state_transition_MM_MS")
( C"
(REWRITE
"state_transition_MM_MS")
((""

(AUTO-REWRITE
"state_transition_MM_NET")

( (..

(REWRITE
"state_transition_MM_NET")
((""

(AUTO-REWRITE
"state_transition_CC_NET")
( ( " ’

(REWRITE
"state_transition_CC_NET")
( C"
(REWRITE "statel")
((""

(REWRITE
"Communication_spec")
((""

(r.

(REWRITE "state")
(REWRITE
"single_step")
((""

(REWRITE
"state_transition_CC_MS_Spec")
( C"

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

141
(REWRITE
’state_transition_CC_NET_Spec")

((..

(REWRITE
"state")
((""

(REWRITE "single_step")
(C*
(REWRITE
"state_transition_CC_MS_Spec")
( (’ "

(REWRITE
"state_transition_CC_NET_Spec")
( C '

(AUTO-REWRITE
"state")
( (""

(REWRITE
"state")
( (""

(AUTO-REWRITE "single_step")
(( " "
(REWRITE
"single_step")
((""

(AUTO-REWRITE
"state_transition_CC_MS_Spec")
((""

(REWRITE
"state_transition_CC_MS_Spec")
( (""

(AUTO-REWRITE
"state_transition_CC_NET_Spec")
((""

(REWRITE
"state_transition_CC_NET_Spec")
((""

(REWRITE
"state")
NIL
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
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NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL))
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL))
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL))
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL))
NIL) )
NIL) )
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